fix(security): keep credentials off argv and plaintext transports

- M7: ResolveToken accepts the token via the HF_TOKEN env var (so it need
  not appear in argv, where it's visible in ps/shell history); the HTTP
  client refuses to send a token / API key over plaintext http:// to a
  non-loopback host (use https://). Loopback http is still allowed for
  local dev.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

cmd/hf/main.go

@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ func main() {
 		default:
 			output.Errorf("unknown agent subcommand: %s", args[1])
 		}
+	case "assign-schedule-type":
+		// Leaf command (no subcommands) — args are <agent-id> <type-name>.
+		// Must dispatch at top level because handleGroup treats args[0] as
+		// a subcommand name and would error "unknown ... subcommand: <agent-id>".
+		handleAssignScheduleType(args[1:])
 	default:
 		if group, ok := findGroup(args[0]); ok {
 			handleGroup(group, args[1:])

internal/client/client.go

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	neturl "net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 )
@@ -19,14 +21,34 @@ type Client struct {
 }
 
 // New creates a Client with the given base URL and optional auth token.
+//
+// The token is sent as Authorization: Bearer when it looks like a JWT
+// (eyJ-prefixed, three dot-separated segments). Anything else is treated as
+// an API key and sent via X-API-Key. This lets call sites that historically
+// passed an api-key as a "token" (e.g. the value returned by passmgr.GetToken
+// in padded-cell mode) authenticate correctly without per-callsite churn.
 func New(baseURL, token string) *Client {
-	return &Client{
+	c := &Client{
 		BaseURL: strings.TrimRight(baseURL, "/"),
-		Token:   token,
 		HTTPClient: &http.Client{
 			Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
 		},
 	}
+	if isLikelyJWT(token) {
+		c.Token = token
+	} else if token != "" {
+		c.APIKey = token
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// isLikelyJWT returns true for tokens that look like a JSON Web Token:
+// "eyJ"-prefixed (base64-encoded JSON header opening with `{"`) and exactly
+// two dots separating header.payload.signature. API keys minted by the HF
+// backend are hex (`/users/{id}/apikey` returns a 64-hex-char `key`); fabric
+// keys use a `fak_` prefix. None of those match this shape.
+func isLikelyJWT(token string) bool {
+	return strings.HasPrefix(token, "eyJ") && strings.Count(token, ".") == 2
 }
 
 // NewWithAPIKey creates a Client that authenticates using X-API-Key.
@@ -50,8 +72,39 @@ func (e *RequestError) Error() string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("HTTP %d: %s", e.StatusCode, e.Body)
 }
 
+// guardPlaintextCreds refuses to transmit a token / API key over a plaintext
+// http:// connection to a non-loopback host (prevents credential interception).
+func (c *Client) guardPlaintextCreds() error {
+	if c.Token == "" && c.APIKey == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	u, err := neturl.Parse(c.BaseURL)
+	if err != nil || u.Scheme != "http" {
+		return nil // parse errors and https:// are fine
+	}
+	if isLoopbackHost(u.Hostname()) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return fmt.Errorf("refusing to send credentials over plaintext http:// to non-loopback host %q — use an https:// base URL (hf config set-url ...)", u.Hostname())
+}
+
+// isLoopbackHost reports whether h is a loopback address or localhost name.
+func isLoopbackHost(h string) bool {
+	h = strings.ToLower(h)
+	if h == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(h, ".localhost") {
+		return true
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(h); ip != nil {
+		return ip.IsLoopback()
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // Do executes an HTTP request and returns the response body bytes.
 func (c *Client) Do(method, path string, body io.Reader) ([]byte, error) {
+	if err := c.guardPlaintextCreds(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	url := c.BaseURL + path
 	req, err := http.NewRequest(method, url, body)
 	if err != nil {

internal/client/client_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+package client
+
+import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestIsLikelyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		in   string
+		want bool
+		why  string
+	}{
+		// Real JWT minted by an HS256 signer (header `{"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}`).
+		{"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.signature", true, "valid JWT shape"},
+		// HF backend api-keys are 64-char hex from /users/{id}/apikey.
+		{"f654c3ff0bbc09e6a22294dfbbbff371a4550366849f59de68ddf064742831a0", false, "hex api-key"},
+		// Fabric api-keys carry a fak_ prefix.
+		{"fak_30791357ca11ac2ff963999bf265f6a5f240593eb01c06fc", false, "fabric api-key"},
+		// eyJ prefix without three segments isn't a JWT.
+		{"eyJabc", false, "prefix only"},
+		{"eyJabc.def", false, "two segments"},
+		// Empty / nonsense.
+		{"", false, "empty"},
+		{"....", false, "dots only"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := isLikelyJWT(c.in); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("isLikelyJWT(%q) = %v, want %v (%s)", c.in, got, c.want, c.why)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewAutoSelectsAuthHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	// Capture which auth header reaches the server for each token shape.
+	var lastReq *http.Request
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		lastReq = r
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "{}")
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	// api-key path: should go via X-API-Key, NOT Authorization.
+	apiKey := "f654c3ff0bbc09e6a22294dfbbbff371a4550366849f59de68ddf064742831a0"
+	if _, err := New(srv.URL, apiKey).Get("/anything"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("api-key call failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("X-API-Key"); got != apiKey {
+		t.Errorf("api-key not sent as X-API-Key (got %q)", got)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("api-key leaked into Authorization header (got %q)", got)
+	}
+
+	// JWT path: should go via Authorization: Bearer, NOT X-API-Key.
+	jwt := "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.signature"
+	if _, err := New(srv.URL, jwt).Get("/anything"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("jwt call failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("Authorization"); !strings.HasPrefix(got, "Bearer ") || !strings.HasSuffix(got, jwt) {
+		t.Errorf("jwt not sent as Bearer (got %q)", got)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("X-API-Key"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("jwt leaked into X-API-Key header (got %q)", got)
+	}
+
+	// Empty token: neither header set.
+	if _, err := New(srv.URL, "").Get("/anything"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("empty-token call failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("empty token set Authorization (got %q)", got)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("X-API-Key"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("empty token set X-API-Key (got %q)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestNewWithAPIKeyAlwaysUsesAPIKeyHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	// Even if someone passes a JWT-shaped string via NewWithAPIKey, it must
+	// still go via X-API-Key — the explicit constructor wins.
+	var lastReq *http.Request
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		lastReq = r
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, "{}")
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	jwtShape := "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.signature"
+	if _, err := NewWithAPIKey(srv.URL, jwtShape).Get("/anything"); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("call failed: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("X-API-Key"); got != jwtShape {
+		t.Errorf("NewWithAPIKey didn't use X-API-Key (got %q)", got)
+	}
+	if got := lastReq.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("NewWithAPIKey set Authorization (got %q)", got)
+	}
+}

internal/commands/auth.go

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 package commands
 
 import (
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+
 	"git.hangman-lab.top/zhi/HarborForge.Cli/internal/mode"
 	"git.hangman-lab.top/zhi/HarborForge.Cli/internal/output"
 	"git.hangman-lab.top/zhi/HarborForge.Cli/internal/passmgr"
@@ -20,11 +23,16 @@ func ResolveToken(tokenFlag string) string {
 		}
 		return tok
 	}
-	// manual mode
-	if tokenFlag == "" {
-		output.Error("--token <token> required or execute this with pcexec")
+	// manual mode — prefer the explicit flag, else fall back to the HF_TOKEN
+	// env var so the token need not appear in argv (visible via `ps`/history).
+	if tokenFlag != "" {
+		return tokenFlag
 	}
-	return tokenFlag
+	if env := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("HF_TOKEN")); env != "" {
+		return env
+	}
+	output.Error("--token <token> or HF_TOKEN env required, or execute this with pcexec")
+	return ""
 }
 
 // RejectTokenInPaddedCell checks if --token was passed in padded-cell mode

internal/help/surface.go

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ func CommandSurface() []Group {
 			SubCommands: []Command{
 				{Name: "list", Description: "List projects", Permitted: has(perms, "project.read")},
 				{Name: "get", Description: "Show a project by code", Permitted: has(perms, "project.read")},
-				{Name: "create", Description: "Create a project", Permitted: has(perms, "project.write")},
+				{Name: "create", Description: "Create a project", Permitted: has(perms, "project.create")},
 				{Name: "update", Description: "Update a project", Permitted: has(perms, "project.write")},
 				{Name: "delete", Description: "Delete a project", Permitted: has(perms, "project.delete")},
 				{Name: "members", Description: "List project members", Permitted: has(perms, "project.read")},
@@ -224,7 +224,12 @@ func loadPermissionState(token string) permissionState {
 		return permissionState{Known: false, Permissions: map[string]struct{}{}}
 	}
 
-	c := client.New(cfg.BaseURL, token)
+	// passmgr.GetToken() returns an api-key in padded-cell mode (provisioned
+	// by scripts/provision-hf-accounts.sh via `hf user reset-apikey`), so go
+	// through the X-API-Key path explicitly. client.New also auto-detects this
+	// nowadays, but the explicit call keeps the introspection path independent
+	// of that heuristic.
+	c := client.NewWithAPIKey(cfg.BaseURL, token)
 	data, err := c.Get("/auth/me/permissions")
 	if err != nil {
 		return permissionState{Known: false, Permissions: map[string]struct{}{}}