hzhang 801a63f8bb fix(security): close critical auth/SSRF/RBAC holes ...

Verified locally end-to-end (before: exploitable, after: blocked).

- config: refuse to start on weak/default/short SECRET_KEY (was
  trivially forgeable JWT -> full admin)
- deps: add reusable require_admin dependency (JWT or API key)
- api-keys: require admin to mint/list/revoke; mask key on list
  (was unauthenticated -> instant admin API key)
- webhooks: whole router now admin-only (was fully unauthenticated
  CRUD + readable logs)
- webhook delivery: validate URL scheme + reject hosts resolving to
  private/loopback/link-local/reserved IPs; disable redirects
  (was a readable SSRF primitive)
- rbac: implement a real project-role hierarchy in check_project_role
  (was a no-op: any member, even guest, passed admin/mgr gates)
- misc: auth on delete_milestone (+ensure_can_edit_milestone),
  worklog create/delete (force caller user_id, owner-only delete),
  /activity and /export/tasks (were unauthenticated data exposure)
- tasks: auth + ensure_can_edit_task on assign_task and batch_assign

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-05-16 16:53:14 +01:00

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