31 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
345e0f3a04 feat(schedule_type): minute-precision windows + variable maintenance length
Lifts the two hard restrictions in PR #18:
  * window bounds were `int hour` (0-23) → now `int minutes-since-UTC-midnight` (0-1439)
  * maintenance window was exactly 1 hour → now any duration in [1, 180] minutes
    ((maint_to - maint_from) mod 1440)

## Schema migration (additive)

`_migrate_schema()` detects legacy "hours" rows (any row where MAX of the
6 window columns is ≤ 23) and multiplies each column by 60 to convert
to minutes. Idempotent — post-conversion values are well above 23 so
the guard never fires twice.

## Touched surfaces

- `models/schedule_type.py` — column comments updated; new
  `compute_maintenance_duration()` helper (returns 1-1440 min, treats
  from==to as 1440 which is then rejected by validator)
- `schemas/schedule_type.py` — `*_from`/`*_to` upper bound 23 → 1440;
  `_validate_maintenance_window` accepts 1-180min duration; response
  includes derived `maintenance_duration_minutes`
- `schemas/schedule_type_special_slot.py` — `minute_in_window` max
  59→179; `estimated_duration` max 60→180
- `routers/schedule_type.py` — PATCH re-validates merged maintenance
  pair (partial updates can put the row into an invalid combo the
  pydantic single-field validator can't catch); `_attach_derived`
  populates the new response field
- `routers/schedule_type_special_slot.py` — `_validate_fits_window`
  now takes the parent's maintenance duration instead of hard-coded 60
- `routers/calendar.py` — `_scheduled_inside_window` arg renamed
  hour→min; the maintenance-window guard error message formats
  HH:MM not HH:00
- `services/special_slot_materialiser.py` — materialised
  `scheduled_at` derived from `(maint_from_min + tpl.minute_in_window)`
  with hour/minute split

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 20:18:21 +01:00
e5e81d418d Merge pull request 'feat(users): PATCH /users/{id}/bind-agent to backfill agents row' (#20) from feat/user-bind-agent into main 2026-05-22 18:58:25 +00:00
6400f7f612 feat(users): PATCH /users/{id}/bind-agent to backfill agents row
Companion endpoint for the cli's upcoming `hf user bind-agent` subcommand.
Lets admin retroactively bind an existing user to (agent_id,
claw_identifier) when that user was created before `hf user create`
supported the binding flags (i.e. all of zhi/lyn/mirror/sherlock/orion/
nav on prod today — agents table has 0 rows even though their user rows
exist).

Schema:
  PATCH /users/{identifier}/bind-agent
  body: {agent_id: str, claw_identifier: str}  // both required
  perm: account.create (admin auto)            // same as POST /users

Behaviour:
  * idempotent: re-bind to the same (agent_id, claw_identifier) → 200
    no-op, no extra row
  * 409 if user is already bound to a different pair
  * 409 if requested agent_id is already in use by another user
  * creates the agents row inline; subsequent /schedule-types/agent/
    {agent_id}/assign etc. then work normally

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 19:58:06 +01:00
5b59806e38 Merge pull request 'fix(schedule-type): accept X-API-Key for CRUD' (#19) from feat/schedule-type-apikey-auth into main 2026-05-22 18:36:20 +00:00
23632aa073 fix(schedule-type): accept X-API-Key for CRUD
The /schedule-types/ router was the last surface still gated on
get_current_user (JWT-only). The companion special-slot router
(PR #18) used get_current_user_or_apikey, so the admin flow was:

  * create a schedule_type → DB direct insert (cli can't reach it)
  * add special slot via API → works

Swaps all 5 CRUD endpoints (list / create / patch / delete /
assign-agent) to get_current_user_or_apikey so the same hzhang
admin api_key that works for special-slot creation now works for
schedule_type creation too. /schedule-types/agent/me already uses
X-Agent-ID headers (not user auth), so no change there.

Existing JWT callers are unaffected — get_current_user_or_apikey
tries api_key first then falls back to JWT.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 19:35:56 +01:00
7017d3483e Merge pull request 'feat(calendar): maintenance window + schedule_type special slots' (#18) from feat/maintenance-window-and-special-slots into main 2026-05-22 18:19:06 +00:00
dcaaa4259a feat(calendar): maintenance window + schedule_type special slots
## What this adds

1. **Maintenance window on ScheduleType**
   - New columns: maintenance_from / maintenance_to (UTC hours, 0-23)
   - Invariant: window is exactly 1 hour (validated in pydantic;
     maintenance_to must equal (maintenance_from + 1) % 24)
   - Default applied via additive migration: 8:00-9:00 UTC for existing
     rows so deployments don't crash on first boot

2. **ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot** — admin-managed slot template
   - New table schedule_type_special_slots
   - Admin (schedule_type.manage) CRUD via
     /schedule-types/{id}/special-slots
   - Fields: name, description, minute_in_window (0-59 inside the
     parent maintenance window), estimated_duration, priority,
     event_data (JSON merged into materialised slot), is_active
   - Unique constraint (schedule_type_id, name) — name is the stable
     human-readable identifier per cohort

3. **Per-agent materialisation**
   - New service app/services/special_slot_materialiser.py
   - GET /calendar/sync calls materialise_special_slots_for_claw
     (idempotent, one row per agent per template per date)
   - GET /calendar/day calls materialise_special_slots_for_user
   - Materialised rows are slot_type=system, event_type=system_event,
     is_admin_locked=true, special_slot_id pointing back to template
   - Plugin's runSync picks them up like any other due slot via the
     normal real-slots query path

4. **Admin-locked enforcement**
   - New TimeSlot columns: is_admin_locked, special_slot_id (FK to
     schedule_type_special_slots, ON DELETE SET NULL)
   - PATCH /calendar/slots/{id}: refuses any edit on admin-locked
     slots (423)
   - POST /calendar/slots/{id}/cancel: refuses cancel on admin-locked
     (423)
   - PATCH /calendar/slots/{id}/agent-update: admin-locked accept only
     ongoing/paused/finished/aborted statuses (423 on other transitions)

5. **Maintenance-window guard on slot creation**
   - POST /calendar/slots: rejects slot_type=system outright (only
     materialiser may create system slots) and rejects any non-system
     slot whose [scheduled_at, +duration] intersects the calling
     user's schedule_type maintenance window (422). Handles 23->0 wrap

6. **Schema response**
   - TimeSlotResponse / CalendarSlotItem now include is_admin_locked
     and special_slot_id so clients can render the lock indicator and
     trace back to the template

## Migration

Additive only — no destructive changes. Lives in _migrate_schema()
in app/main.py; the new schedule_type_special_slots table is created
by Base.metadata.create_all() on first boot.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 19:18:42 +01:00
c6d2ecbf95 Merge pull request 'feature/oidc-login' (#17) from feature/oidc-login into main
Reviewed-on: #17
2026-05-17 21:27:39 +00:00
5a5e3fa2eb fix(security): block OIDC-binding privilege escalation
The oidc-binding PUT/DELETE endpoints allowed any account.create holder
(non-admin role 'account-manager') to bind an attacker-controlled OIDC
identity to the admin account (or unbind admin, reopening the OIDC-only
bootstrap window) — full admin takeover.

Non-admin callers may now only manage bindings of non-privileged
accounts: requests targeting an is_admin user, the built-in
acc-mgr/deleted-user, or any holder of account.create / user.reset-apikey
are rejected with 403. Global admins remain unrestricted, so the
intended "account-manager binds normal users" capability is preserved.

Found by post-feature security audit. Verified locally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 22:07:43 +01:00
1c91cb32fc feat(auth): OIDC-only admin-role bootstrap auto-connect
In OIDC-only mode, before any admin is linked, an IdP user whose token
carries the configured admin role (default "admin"; OIDC_ADMIN_ROLE /
oidc_settings.admin_role) auto-connects to the unbound hf admin on
first OIDC sign-in, then the window self-closes once any admin is
bound. Roles are scanned across userinfo + the (unverified) access
token: realm_access.roles, resource_access.*.roles, roles/role/groups.
Adds admin_role to settings model/env/effective/API and to the wizard
bootstrap config. Replaces the manual admin-subject approach.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 21:05:39 +01:00
f64e2a24f8 feat(init): bootstrap OIDC from wizard config
init_wizard applies config['oidc'] on first init: creates the
oidc_settings row and, when admin_subject is given, binds the
bootstrap admin so OIDC-only deployments are reachable. Idempotent —
an existing row / admin binding is preserved (later admin edits via
the API survive restarts).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 20:50:59 +01:00
ece2b550fc docs: OIDC feature test plan / test points
Test points for OIDC login, user binding, HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY mode,
and the admin OIDC settings page, with local verification status.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 20:40:26 +01:00
f8126d0cbc feat(auth): admin-configurable OIDC provider (oidc_settings)
Persist OIDC config in a single-row oidc_settings table; non-empty DB
fields override the OIDC_* env vars (env = bootstrap default). The
Authlib client is rebuilt when config changes.

- GET/PUT /auth/oidc/settings — admin only, via JWT OR API key. The
  API-key path is the recovery channel when OIDC-only mode is on and
  OIDC is misconfigured (avoids total lockout).
- client_secret is write-only: never returned (has_client_secret bool),
  preserved when the field is left blank on update.
- /auth/config, login/link/callback now use the effective (DB|env)
  config so enabling OIDC needs no redeploy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 20:29:15 +01:00
54b6103880 feat(auth): OIDC login + identity binding + HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY
- Generic OIDC (Authlib discovery) Authorization Code flow; backend
  issues the existing HS256 JWT on success. Unbound identities are
  rejected (no auto-provisioning).
- User.oidc_issuer/oidc_subject (unique together) + startup migration.
- PUT/DELETE /users/{id}/oidc-binding (admin or account-manager;
  JWT or API key; 409 on conflict). Self-link /auth/oidc/link
  (non-OIDC_ONLY only). Public GET /auth/config.
- HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY: /auth/token rejected, create/update ignore
  password (passwordless users; API keys + OIDC still work).
- Dockerfile ARG/ENV HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY; authlib+itsdangerous deps;
  SessionMiddleware for OIDC state. Fixed _user_response to expose
  the new binding fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 20:22:04 +01:00
d2fafdfe9c Merge security/critical-auth-fixes into main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 17:55:59 +01:00
f03bfe9093 docs: README accuracy pass + Security section
Document the auth/RBAC/SSRF hardening in this branch: mandatory strong
SECRET_KEY (server refuses weak/default), admin-only + masked /api-keys,
admin-only /webhooks with SSRF guard, project role hierarchy, and auth
added to previously-open endpoints. Fixed stale Issues→tasks model.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 17:50:25 +01:00
801a63f8bb fix(security): close critical auth/SSRF/RBAC holes
Verified locally end-to-end (before: exploitable, after: blocked).

- config: refuse to start on weak/default/short SECRET_KEY (was
  trivially forgeable JWT -> full admin)
- deps: add reusable require_admin dependency (JWT or API key)
- api-keys: require admin to mint/list/revoke; mask key on list
  (was unauthenticated -> instant admin API key)
- webhooks: whole router now admin-only (was fully unauthenticated
  CRUD + readable logs)
- webhook delivery: validate URL scheme + reject hosts resolving to
  private/loopback/link-local/reserved IPs; disable redirects
  (was a readable SSRF primitive)
- rbac: implement a real project-role hierarchy in check_project_role
  (was a no-op: any member, even guest, passed admin/mgr gates)
- misc: auth on delete_milestone (+ensure_can_edit_milestone),
  worklog create/delete (force caller user_id, owner-only delete),
  /activity and /export/tasks (were unauthenticated data exposure)
- tasks: auth + ensure_can_edit_task on assign_task and batch_assign

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-16 16:53:14 +01:00
b7ae20e43f Merge pull request 'zhi-2026-04-18' (#16) from zhi-2026-04-18 into main
Reviewed-on: #16
2026-05-01 07:24:35 +00:00
69c4e17d0f Merge branch 'main' into zhi-2026-04-18 2026-05-01 07:24:28 +00:00
zhi
8ab9cae474 feat: schedule type system for work/entertainment periods
- New model: ScheduleType (name, work_from/to, entertainment_from/to)
- Agent.schedule_type_id FK to schedule_types
- CRUD API: GET/POST/PATCH/DELETE /schedule-types/
- Agent assignment: PUT /schedule-types/agent/{agent_id}/assign
- Agent self-query: GET /schedule-types/agent/me
- Permissions: schedule_type.read, schedule_type.manage
- Migration: adds schedule_type_id column to agents table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-21 09:20:51 +00:00
zhi
5b7169a3cf feat: add /calendar/sync endpoint for multi-agent schedule sync
Returns today's slots for all agents on a claw instance, keyed by
agent_id. Used by HF Plugin to maintain a local schedule cache
instead of per-agent heartbeat.

Also records heartbeat for all agents on the instance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 09:30:57 +00:00
630c215e62 fix: Essential model uses created_by_id not user_id
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 23:17:32 +01:00
00846f92df fix: correct ActivityLog import name in user deletion
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 23:15:45 +01:00
04fa209f22 feat: add deleted-user builtin and safe user deletion
- Add deleted-user as a built-in account (no permissions, cannot log in)
  created during init_wizard, protected from deletion like acc-mgr
- On user delete, reassign all foreign key references to deleted-user
  then delete the original user, instead of failing on IntegrityError
- API keys, notifications, and project memberships are deleted outright
  since they're meaningless without the real user

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 23:08:19 +01:00
76c741a7ba Merge pull request 'feat(Dockerfile): multi-stage build to reduce image size from 852MB to ~200MB' (#15) from multi-stage into main
Reviewed-on: #15
2026-04-16 21:23:04 +00:00
d92f8c76b2 Merge branch 'main' into multi-stage 2026-04-16 21:22:54 +00:00
779854d69f Merge pull request 'dev-2026-03-29' (#14) from dev-2026-03-29 into main
Reviewed-on: #14
2026-04-16 21:22:03 +00:00
61fcca8aff feat: grant user.reset-apikey permission to account-manager role
Allows acc-mgr to reset user API keys, enabling automated
provisioning workflows via the CLI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 21:19:13 +00:00
5696a068e6 feat: allow API key auth for reset-apikey endpoint
Change dependency from get_current_user (OAuth2 only) to
get_current_user_or_apikey, enabling account-manager API key
to reset user API keys for provisioning workflows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 21:17:13 +00:00
a3be8380c9 feat(Dockerfile): multi-stage build to reduce image size from 852MB to ~200MB
Stage 1 (builder): install build deps and pre-download wheels
Stage 2 (runtime): copy only installed packages + runtime deps, no build tools
2026-04-15 01:27:44 +00:00
beb95f7bbe Merge pull request 'HarborForge.Backend: dev-2026-03-29 -> main' (#13) from dev-2026-03-29 into main
Reviewed-on: #13
2026-04-05 22:08:14 +00:00
30 changed files with 2385 additions and 138 deletions

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@@ -1,25 +1,52 @@
FROM python:3.11-slim
# Stage 1: build dependencies
FROM python:3.11-slim AS builder
WORKDIR /app
# Install system dependencies
# Install build dependencies
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
build-essential \
curl \
default-libmysqlclient-dev \
pkg-config \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Pre-download wheels to avoid recompiling bcrypt from source
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --prefix=/install \
'bcrypt==4.0.1' \
'cffi>=2.0' \
'pycparser>=2.0'
# Install Python dependencies
COPY requirements.txt .
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --prefix=/install -r requirements.txt
# Stage 2: slim runtime
FROM python:3.11-slim
WORKDIR /app
# Install runtime dependencies only (no build tools)
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
default-libmysqlclient-dev \
curl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Copy installed packages from builder
COPY --from=builder /install /usr/local
# Copy application code
COPY . .
COPY app/ ./app/
COPY requirements.txt ./
# Make entrypoint
COPY entrypoint.sh .
RUN chmod +x entrypoint.sh
# Expose port
EXPOSE 8000
# OIDC-only mode: when "true", password login is rejected, user creation
# ignores passwords (passwordless users that sign in via a bound OIDC
# identity / API keys). Overridable at runtime via the same env var.
ARG HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY=false
ENV HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY=${HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY}
# Wait for wizard config, then start uvicorn
EXPOSE 8000
ENTRYPOINT ["./entrypoint.sh"]

232
README.md
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@@ -1,100 +1,163 @@
# HarborForge Backend
Agent/人类协同任务管理平台 - FastAPI 后端
The core REST API for HarborForge — an Agent/人类协同任务管理平台 (Agent/Human collaborative task-management platform).
## API Endpoints (38)
Part of the [HarborForge](../README.md) platform.
### Auth
- `POST /auth/token` - 登录获取 JWT token
- `GET /auth/me` - 获取当前用户信息
- **Role:** core REST API — users, projects, tasks, milestones, proposals, RBAC, webhooks, worklogs, notifications, monitor telemetry.
- **Stack:** Python 3.11 · FastAPI · SQLAlchemy · MySQL
- **Port:** `8000`
### Issues
The service reads its database configuration from the AbstractWizard config volume (falling back to env/defaults) and authenticates requests with JWT (HS256) signed by `SECRET_KEY`.
> Issues 和 Search 列表接口返回分页格式:`{items, total, page, page_size, total_pages}`
> Issues 支持排序参数:`sort_by` (created_at/priority/title/due_date/status), `sort_order` (asc/desc)
> Issues 支持额外过滤:`assignee_id`, `tag`
## Run / Build
### Docker
> Issues 和 Search 列表接口返回分页格式:
> Issues 支持排序参数: (created_at/priority/title/due_date/status), (asc/desc)
> Issues 支持额外过滤:,
- `POST /issues` - 创建 issue支持 resolution 决议案类型)
- `GET /issues` - 列表(分页、排序、按 assignee/tag 过滤)(支持按 project/status/type 过滤)
- `GET /issues/{id}` - 详情
- `PATCH /issues/{id}` - 更新
- `DELETE /issues/{id}` - 删除
- `POST /issues/{id}/transition` - 状态变更(触发 webhook
- `GET /search/issues?q=keyword` - 搜索
```bash
docker build -t harborforge-backend .
docker run -p 8000:8000 \
-e SECRET_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
-v /path/to/config:/config \
harborforge-backend
```
### Comments
- `POST /comments` - 创建评论
- `GET /issues/{id}/comments` - 列表
- `PATCH /comments/{id}` - 更新
- `DELETE /comments/{id}` - 删除
### Local (uvicorn)
### Projects
- `POST /projects` - 创建
- `GET /projects` - 列表
- `GET /projects/{id}` - 详情
- `PATCH /projects/{id}` - 更新
- `DELETE /projects/{id}` - 删除
```bash
pip install -r requirements.txt
export SECRET_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)"
uvicorn app.main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000
```
### Project Members
- `POST /projects/{id}/members` - 添加成员
- `GET /projects/{id}/members` - 列表
- `DELETE /projects/{id}/members/{user_id}` - 移除
On startup the app creates/migrates the schema, runs AbstractWizard
initialization (admin user, default project, default roles), and starts a
background monitor-polling thread.
### Users
- `POST /users` - 注册
- `GET /users` - 列表
- `GET /users/{id}` - 详情
- `PATCH /users/{id}` - 更新
## Configuration
### Webhooks
- `POST /webhooks` - 创建
- `GET /webhooks` - 列表
- `GET /webhooks/{id}` - 详情
- `PATCH /webhooks/{id}` - 更新
- `DELETE /webhooks/{id}` - 删除
- `GET /webhooks/{id}/logs` - 投递日志
Environment variables (also loadable from a `.env` file):
### System
- `GET /health` - 健康检查
- `GET /version` - 版本信息
- `GET /dashboard/stats` - 统计面板
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `SECRET_KEY` | *(none — must be set)* | JWT signing key (HS256). The server **refuses to start** with a weak/default/short value. |
| `DATABASE_URL` | `mysql+pymysql://harborforge:harborforge_pass@mysql:3306/harborforge` | Fallback DB URL when the wizard config volume is absent. |
| `ALGORITHM` | `HS256` | JWT algorithm. |
| `ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES` | `30` | Access-token lifetime. |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | `INFO` | Log level. |
| `CONFIG_DIR` | `/config` | AbstractWizard config volume directory. |
| `CONFIG_FILE` | `harborforge.json` | Config file name within `CONFIG_DIR`. |
### Milestones
- `POST /milestones` - 创建里程碑
- `GET /milestones` - 列表(支持按 project/status 过滤)
- `GET /milestones/{id}` - 详情
- `PATCH /milestones/{id}` - 更新
- `DELETE /milestones/{id}` - 删除
- `GET /milestones/{id}/issues` - 里程碑下的 issue 列表
- `GET /milestones/{id}/progress` - 里程碑完成进度
Database resolution order: **wizard config volume** (`$CONFIG_DIR/$CONFIG_FILE``database` block) → `DATABASE_URL` env → built-in default.
### Notifications
- `GET /notifications` - 列表(支持 user_id, unread_only 过滤)
- `GET /notifications/count` - 未读通知计数
- `POST /notifications/{id}/read` - 标记已读
- `POST /notifications/read-all` - 全部标记已读
## Security
### Issue Assignment
- `POST /issues/{id}/assign` - 指派 issue自动发送通知
The current code enforces the following security posture. These are
operational requirements, not optional hardening.
### Webhook Retry
- `POST /webhooks/{id}/retry/{log_id}` - 重试失败的 webhook 投递
### Mandatory strong `SECRET_KEY`
### Time Tracking (Work Logs)
- `POST /worklogs` - 记录工时
- `GET /issues/{id}/worklogs` - 某 issue 的工时记录
- `GET /issues/{id}/worklogs/summary` - 某 issue 工时汇总
- `GET /users/{id}/worklogs` - 某用户的工时记录
- `DELETE /worklogs/{id}` - 删除工时记录
- `GET /projects/{id}/worklogs/summary` - 项目工时汇总(按用户分组)
`app/core/config.py` validates `SECRET_KEY` at import time and **raises and
refuses to start** if the value is empty, shorter than 32 characters, or a
known default/placeholder (e.g. `change-me-in-production`, `secret`,
`changeme`). Operators **must** provide a strong random key:
### Export
- `GET /export/issues` - 导出 issues CSV
- `GET /issues/overdue` - 逾期未完成的 issue
```bash
openssl rand -hex 32
```
A weak signing key allows JWT forgery and full authentication bypass, so this
check is intentionally fatal.
### API-key management is admin-only and masked
The `/api-keys` endpoints (`POST`, `GET`, `DELETE /api-keys/{id}`) all require
a global admin (`require_admin`). Listing **never returns the full secret**
keys are masked to a short prefix/suffix (e.g. `abc123…9f`). The full key is
only returned once, on creation.
### Webhooks router is admin-only with SSRF protection
The entire `/webhooks` router is mounted with `dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]`,
so every webhook endpoint (create/list/get/update/delete/logs/retry) requires a
global admin. Webhook delivery (`app/services/webhook.py`) validates the target
URL before sending:
- Only `http`/`https` schemes are allowed.
- The host is DNS-resolved and **every** resolved address is rejected if it is
private, loopback, link-local, multicast, reserved, or unspecified
(SSRF protection).
- HTTP redirects are disabled (`follow_redirects=False`).
### Project role hierarchy enforcement
`check_project_role` in `app/api/rbac.py` enforces a real, ordered role
hierarchy rather than a flat membership check:
```
guest(0) < viewer(1) < member(2) < dev(3) < mgr(4) < admin(5)
```
A caller below the required rank is denied with `403`, and any unknown role on
either side is denied by default. Global admins bypass project-level checks.
### Authentication on previously open endpoints
The following endpoints now require an authenticated caller
(JWT bearer token **or** `X-API-Key`) and enforce ownership/permission:
- `DELETE /milestones/{id}` — requires milestone-edit permission.
- `POST /worklogs` — worklogs are always attributed to the caller; only admins
may log time for another user.
- `DELETE /worklogs/{id}` — caller-scoped; non-admins cannot delete another
user's worklog.
- `POST /tasks/{task_code}/assign` and `POST /tasks/batch/assign`.
- `GET /activity`.
- `GET /export/tasks`.
## Authentication
- `POST /auth/token` — OAuth2 password grant; returns a JWT bearer token.
- Authenticated requests send `Authorization: Bearer <token>` **or**
`X-API-Key: <key>` (API keys map to a user and are created by admins).
- `GET /auth/me` — current user.
- `GET /auth/me/permissions`, `GET /auth/me/apikey-permissions` — permission introspection.
## Key API Areas
| Area | Prefix / Routes | Notes |
|------|-----------------|-------|
| Auth | `/auth/*` | token, current user, permission introspection |
| Users | `/users` | registration, list/detail/update (list & mutate are admin-only) |
| Projects | `/projects` | CRUD, members (`/projects/{id}/members`), worklog summary |
| Project members | `/projects/{id}/members` | add/list/remove with role |
| Milestones | `/projects/{id}/milestones`, `/milestones/{id}` | CRUD, items, progress |
| Milestone actions | preflight / freeze / start / close | lifecycle transitions |
| Tasks | `/tasks` | CRUD, transition, take, assign, batch transition/assign, tags, search |
| Comments | `/comments`, `/tasks/{id}/comments` | CRUD |
| Proposals | `/projects/{code}/proposals` | propose / accept / reject / reopen (legacy `/proposes`) |
| Essentials | proposal essentials | feature/improvement/refactor items |
| Meetings | `/meetings` | create/list/detail/update/delete/attend |
| Roles & RBAC | `/roles` | roles, permissions, role-permission assignment |
| Webhooks | `/webhooks` | **admin-only**; CRUD, logs, retry (SSRF-guarded delivery) |
| API keys | `/api-keys` | **admin-only**; create/list (masked)/revoke |
| Worklogs | `/worklogs`, `/tasks/{id}/worklogs`, `/users/{id}/worklogs` | time tracking & summaries |
| Notifications | `/notifications` | list, unread count, mark read / read-all |
| Activity | `/activity` | activity log (authenticated) |
| Export | `/export/tasks` | CSV export (authenticated) |
| Calendar | `/calendar` | scheduling / time slots |
| Monitor | `/monitor` | public overview, admin providers/servers, heartbeat telemetry |
| Dashboard | `/dashboard/stats` | aggregate statistics |
| System | `/health`, `/version`, `/config/status` | health, version, init status |
## Task Types
| Type | 用途 |
|------|------|
| issue | 普通任务 |
| story | 用户故事 |
| test | 测试用例 |
| resolution | 决议案Agent 僵局提交)|
## CLI
@@ -102,18 +165,9 @@ The legacy Python CLI (`cli.py`) has been retired. Use the Go-based `hf` CLI ins
See [HarborForge.Cli](../HarborForge.Cli/README.md) for installation and usage.
## 技术栈
## Tech Stack
- Python 3.11 + FastAPI
- SQLAlchemy + MySQL
- JWT (python-jose)
- SQLAlchemy + MySQL (auto schema create/migrate on startup)
- JWT (python-jose, HS256) + bcrypt password hashing
- Docker
## Issue Types
| Type | 用途 |
|------|------|
| task | 普通任务 |
| story | 用户故事 |
| test | 测试用例 |
| resolution | 决议案Agent 僵局提交)|

View File

@@ -76,3 +76,10 @@ async def get_current_user_or_apikey(
if token:
return await get_current_user(token=token, db=db)
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
def require_admin(current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)) -> models.User:
"""Dependency: caller must be a global admin (JWT or API key)."""
if not getattr(current_user, "is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin privileges required")
return current_user

View File

@@ -81,12 +81,28 @@ def check_project_role(db: Session, user_id: int, project_id: int, min_role: str
detail="Role not found"
)
# Legacy compatibility: most current routes use non-hierarchical names like dev/mgr.
# For now, any valid membership passes those broad checks; strict edit rules are handled
# by the explicit can_edit_* helpers below.
if min_role in {"dev", "mgr", "viewer", "member", "guest", "admin"}:
return True
# Enforce a real role hierarchy. Higher rank == more privilege.
_RANK = {
"guest": 0,
"viewer": 1,
"member": 2,
"dev": 3,
"mgr": 4,
"admin": 5,
}
role_rank = _RANK.get((role.name or "").lower())
required_rank = _RANK.get((min_role or "member").lower())
if role_rank is None or required_rank is None:
# Unknown role on either side -> deny by default.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Insufficient project role (have '{role.name}', need '{min_role}')",
)
if role_rank < required_rank:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Insufficient project role (have '{role.name}', need '{min_role}')",
)
return True

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["Auth"])
@router.post("/token", response_model=Token)
async def login(form_data: OAuth2PasswordRequestForm = Depends(), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
if settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Password login is disabled (OIDC only)")
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.username == form_data.username).first()
if not user or not verify_password(form_data.password, user.hashed_password or ""):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Incorrect username or password",

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ from app.core.config import get_db
from app.models.calendar import SchedulePlan, SlotStatus, SlotType, TimeSlot
from app.models.models import User
from app.models.agent import Agent, AgentStatus, ExhaustReason
from app.models.schedule_type import ScheduleType
from app.services.special_slot_materialiser import (
materialise_special_slots_for_claw,
materialise_special_slots_for_user,
)
from app.schemas.calendar import (
AgentHeartbeatResponse,
AgentStatusUpdateRequest,
@@ -143,6 +148,8 @@ def _slot_to_response(slot: TimeSlot) -> TimeSlotResponse:
priority=slot.priority,
status=slot.status.value if hasattr(slot.status, "value") else str(slot.status),
plan_id=slot.plan_id,
is_admin_locked=bool(getattr(slot, "is_admin_locked", False)),
special_slot_id=getattr(slot, "special_slot_id", None),
created_at=slot.created_at,
updated_at=slot.updated_at,
)
@@ -168,6 +175,48 @@ def create_slot(
"""
target_date = payload.date or date_type.today()
# --- Maintenance-window guard ---
# Non-`system` slots may not be placed inside the schedule_type's
# 1-hour maintenance window. The window is admin-territory, reserved
# for materialised special slots from `schedule_type_special_slots`.
# `system` slot_type is itself reserved server-side (the materialiser
# is the only legitimate caller) — refuse it here outright so the
# public API cannot manufacture a fake admin-locked slot.
if payload.slot_type == SlotType.SYSTEM:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
detail=(
"slot_type='system' is reserved for schedule_type special slots "
"and cannot be created via this endpoint"
),
)
_agent_for_user = (
db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.user_id == current_user.id).first()
)
if _agent_for_user and _agent_for_user.schedule_type_id:
st = (
db.query(ScheduleType)
.filter(ScheduleType.id == _agent_for_user.schedule_type_id)
.first()
)
if st and _scheduled_inside_window(
payload.scheduled_at,
payload.estimated_duration,
st.maintenance_from,
st.maintenance_to,
):
mf_h, mf_m = divmod(st.maintenance_from, 60)
mt_h, mt_m = divmod(st.maintenance_to, 60)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
detail=(
f"slot at {payload.scheduled_at} duration {payload.estimated_duration}min "
f"intersects the maintenance window "
f"{mf_h:02d}:{mf_m:02d}-{mt_h:02d}:{mt_m:02d} UTC of "
f"schedule_type '{st.name}' — that window is admin-reserved"
),
)
# --- Overlap check (hard reject) ---
conflicts = check_overlap_for_create(
db,
@@ -236,6 +285,8 @@ def _real_slot_to_item(slot: TimeSlot) -> CalendarSlotItem:
priority=slot.priority,
status=slot.status.value if hasattr(slot.status, "value") else str(slot.status),
plan_id=slot.plan_id,
is_admin_locked=bool(getattr(slot, "is_admin_locked", False)),
special_slot_id=getattr(slot, "special_slot_id", None),
created_at=slot.created_at,
updated_at=slot.updated_at,
)
@@ -289,7 +340,47 @@ def _require_agent(db: Session, agent_id: str, claw_identifier: str) -> Agent:
return agent
def _scheduled_inside_window(
scheduled_at,
estimated_duration_minutes: int,
window_from_min: int,
window_to_min: int,
) -> bool:
"""True if [scheduled_at, scheduled_at+duration] intersects [from, to).
Window bounds are minutes-since-UTC-midnight (0-1439). Handles the
case where the window crosses UTC midnight (e.g. 23:30→01:00).
"""
start_min = scheduled_at.hour * 60 + scheduled_at.minute
end_min = start_min + max(estimated_duration_minutes, 1)
if window_to_min > window_from_min:
# normal same-day window
return start_min < window_to_min and end_min > window_from_min
# wrap-around: window = [from..1440) [0..to)
return (start_min < 1440 and end_min > window_from_min) or end_min > window_to_min
# Admin-locked special slots accept only these agent-driven status
# transitions; movement / cancellation / arbitrary status edits are
# rejected because the schedule_type owner is the source of truth.
_ADMIN_LOCKED_ALLOWED_STATUSES = {
SlotStatusEnum.ONGOING,
SlotStatusEnum.PAUSED,
SlotStatusEnum.FINISHED,
SlotStatusEnum.ABORTED,
}
def _apply_agent_slot_update(slot: TimeSlot, payload: SlotAgentUpdate) -> None:
if getattr(slot, "is_admin_locked", False):
if payload.status not in _ADMIN_LOCKED_ALLOWED_STATUSES:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=423,
detail=(
f"slot {slot.id} is admin-locked (special slot); only "
f"ongoing/paused/finished/aborted are allowed via agent-update"
),
)
slot.status = payload.status.value
if payload.started_at is not None:
slot.started_at = payload.started_at
@@ -377,6 +468,12 @@ def sync_schedules(
"""
today = date_type.today()
# Materialise today's special slots for every agent on this claw
# before reading. This is idempotent — re-runs against an already-
# materialised (agent, date, template) are no-ops. Plugin's runSync
# picks them up like any other slot via the normal real_slots query.
materialise_special_slots_for_claw(db, x_claw_identifier, today, commit=True)
# Find all agents on this claw instance
agents = (
db.query(Agent)
@@ -514,6 +611,10 @@ def get_calendar_day(
"""
target_date = date or date_type.today()
# Materialise today's special slots for this user before reading,
# so the day-view returns them alongside any user-created slots.
materialise_special_slots_for_user(db, current_user.id, target_date, commit=True)
# 1. Fetch real slots for the day
real_slots = (
db.query(TimeSlot)
@@ -589,6 +690,20 @@ def edit_real_slot(
if slot is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Slot not found")
# --- Admin-locked guard ---
# Special slots materialised from a schedule_type template are
# admin-owned; agents may complete/abort/pause/resume via the
# plugin-facing agent-update endpoint but cannot edit time/type/
# duration/event-data via this user-facing edit endpoint.
if getattr(slot, "is_admin_locked", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=423,
detail=(
f"slot {slot.id} is admin-locked (materialised from a special "
f"slot template); only the schedule_type owner can edit it"
),
)
# --- Past-slot guard ---
try:
guard_edit_real_slot(db, slot)
@@ -756,6 +871,16 @@ def cancel_real_slot(
if slot is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Slot not found")
# --- Admin-locked guard ---
if getattr(slot, "is_admin_locked", False):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=423,
detail=(
f"slot {slot.id} is admin-locked (materialised from a special "
f"slot template); only the schedule_type owner can cancel it"
),
)
# --- Past-slot guard ---
try:
guard_cancel_real_slot(db, slot)

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import func as sqlfunc
from pydantic import BaseModel
from app.core.config import get_db
from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey
from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey, require_admin
from app.api.rbac import check_project_role, ensure_can_edit_milestone
from app.models import models
from app.models.apikey import APIKey
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ class APIKeyResponse(BaseModel):
@router.post("/api-keys", response_model=APIKeyResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, tags=["API Keys"])
def create_api_key(data: APIKeyCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def create_api_key(data: APIKeyCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(require_admin)):
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == data.user_id).first()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
@@ -73,15 +74,22 @@ def create_api_key(data: APIKeyCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
@router.get("/api-keys", response_model=List[APIKeyResponse], tags=["API Keys"])
def list_api_keys(user_id: int = None, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def list_api_keys(user_id: int = None, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(require_admin)):
query = db.query(APIKey)
if user_id:
query = query.filter(APIKey.user_id == user_id)
return query.all()
keys = query.all()
# Never expose the full secret on listing; show only a masked prefix.
for k in keys:
if k.key and len(k.key) > 8:
k.key = k.key[:6] + "" + k.key[-2:]
return keys
@router.delete("/api-keys/{key_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, tags=["API Keys"])
def revoke_api_key(key_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def revoke_api_key(key_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(require_admin)):
key_obj = db.query(APIKey).filter(APIKey.id == key_id).first()
if not key_obj:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="API key not found")
@@ -106,7 +114,8 @@ class ActivityLogResponse(BaseModel):
@router.get("/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse], tags=["Activity"])
def list_activity(entity_type: str = None, entity_id: int = None, user_id: int = None,
limit: int = 50, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
limit: int = 50, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
query = db.query(ActivityLog)
if entity_type:
query = query.filter(ActivityLog.entity_type == entity_type)
@@ -199,8 +208,10 @@ def update_milestone(milestone_id: str, ms_update: schemas.MilestoneUpdate, db:
@router.delete("/milestones/{milestone_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, tags=["Milestones"])
def delete_milestone(milestone_id: str, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def delete_milestone(milestone_id: str, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
ms = _resolve_milestone(db, milestone_id)
ensure_can_edit_milestone(db, current_user.id, ms)
db.delete(ms)
db.commit()
return None
@@ -322,16 +333,18 @@ class WorkLogResponse(BaseModel):
@router.post("/worklogs", response_model=WorkLogResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED, tags=["Time Tracking"])
def create_worklog(wl: WorkLogCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def create_worklog(wl: WorkLogCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
task = db.query(Task).filter(Task.id == wl.task_id).first()
if not task:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Task not found")
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == wl.user_id).first()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if wl.hours <= 0:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Hours must be positive")
db_wl = WorkLog(**wl.model_dump())
data = wl.model_dump()
# Worklogs are always attributed to the caller (non-admins cannot log time for others).
if not current_user.is_admin or not data.get("user_id"):
data["user_id"] = current_user.id
db_wl = WorkLog(**data)
db.add(db_wl)
db.commit()
db.refresh(db_wl)
@@ -370,10 +383,13 @@ def task_worklog_summary(task_id: str, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
@router.delete("/worklogs/{worklog_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, tags=["Time Tracking"])
def delete_worklog(worklog_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def delete_worklog(worklog_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
wl = db.query(WorkLog).filter(WorkLog.id == worklog_id).first()
if not wl:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Work log not found")
if not current_user.is_admin and wl.user_id != current_user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Cannot delete another user's worklog")
db.delete(wl)
db.commit()
return None
@@ -382,7 +398,8 @@ def delete_worklog(worklog_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
# ============ Export ============
@router.get("/export/tasks", tags=["Export"])
def export_tasks_csv(project_id: int = None, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def export_tasks_csv(project_id: int = None, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
query = db.query(Task)
if project_id:
query = query.filter(Task.project_id == project_id)

350
app/api/routers/oidc.py Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
"""OIDC (OpenID Connect) login + admin-configurable provider settings.
The OIDC provider can be configured at runtime from the admin UI
(persisted in the oidc_settings table). A stored row's non-empty fields
override the OIDC_* env vars; env values act as bootstrap defaults.
Sign-in policy: an OIDC identity must already be bound to an hf user
(see PUT /users/{id}/oidc-binding). Unbound identities are rejected.
"""
import logging
from datetime import timedelta
from urllib.parse import urlencode
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.core.config import get_db, settings
from app.models import models
from app.models.oidc_settings import OidcSettings
from app.api.deps import create_access_token, get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey
router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["Auth"])
logger = logging.getLogger("harborforge.oidc")
# ---- effective config (DB row overrides env) ------------------------------
class EffectiveOidc:
def __init__(self, enabled, issuer, client_id, client_secret,
redirect_uri, scopes, post_login_redirect, admin_role):
self.enabled = enabled
self.issuer = issuer
self.client_id = client_id
self.client_secret = client_secret
self.redirect_uri = redirect_uri
self.scopes = scopes or "openid email profile"
self.post_login_redirect = post_login_redirect
self.admin_role = (admin_role or "admin").strip() or "admin"
@property
def configured(self) -> bool:
return bool(self.enabled and self.issuer and self.client_id)
def fingerprint(self) -> str:
return "|".join([
str(self.enabled), self.issuer or "", self.client_id or "",
self.client_secret or "", self.redirect_uri or "", self.scopes or "",
])
def get_effective_oidc(db: Session) -> EffectiveOidc:
row = db.query(OidcSettings).filter(OidcSettings.id == 1).first()
def pick(db_val, env_val):
return db_val if (db_val is not None and db_val != "") else env_val
if row is None:
return EffectiveOidc(
settings.OIDC_ENABLED, settings.OIDC_ISSUER, settings.OIDC_CLIENT_ID,
settings.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, settings.OIDC_REDIRECT_URI,
settings.OIDC_SCOPES, settings.OIDC_POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT,
settings.OIDC_ADMIN_ROLE,
)
return EffectiveOidc(
bool(row.enabled),
pick(row.issuer, settings.OIDC_ISSUER),
pick(row.client_id, settings.OIDC_CLIENT_ID),
pick(row.client_secret, settings.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET),
pick(row.redirect_uri, settings.OIDC_REDIRECT_URI),
pick(row.scopes, settings.OIDC_SCOPES),
pick(row.post_login_redirect, settings.OIDC_POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT),
pick(getattr(row, "admin_role", None), settings.OIDC_ADMIN_ROLE),
)
# Authlib client cache, rebuilt when the effective config changes.
_oauth = None
_oauth_fp = None
def _client(cfg: EffectiveOidc):
global _oauth, _oauth_fp
if not cfg.configured:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="OIDC is not configured")
fp = cfg.fingerprint()
if _oauth is None or _oauth_fp != fp:
from authlib.integrations.starlette_client import OAuth
oauth = OAuth()
oauth.register(
name="oidc",
server_metadata_url=cfg.issuer.rstrip("/") + "/.well-known/openid-configuration",
client_id=cfg.client_id,
client_secret=cfg.client_secret,
client_kwargs={"scope": cfg.scopes},
)
_oauth, _oauth_fp = oauth, fp
return _oauth.oidc
def _invalidate_client():
global _oauth, _oauth_fp
_oauth = None
_oauth_fp = None
def _collect_roles(claims: dict, token: dict) -> set[str]:
"""Roles from common OIDC claim shapes, across the ID-token/userinfo
claims and the (unverified) access token — Keycloak puts realm/client
roles in the access token by default."""
pools = [claims if isinstance(claims, dict) else {}]
at = token.get("access_token")
if at:
try:
from jose import jwt as _jwt
pools.append(_jwt.get_unverified_claims(at))
except Exception:
pass
roles: set[str] = set()
for p in pools:
if not isinstance(p, dict):
continue
ra = p.get("realm_access")
if isinstance(ra, dict):
roles.update(ra.get("roles") or [])
res = p.get("resource_access")
if isinstance(res, dict):
for v in res.values():
if isinstance(v, dict):
roles.update(v.get("roles") or [])
for key in ("roles", "role", "groups"):
val = p.get(key)
if isinstance(val, str):
roles.add(val)
elif isinstance(val, (list, tuple)):
roles.update(str(x) for x in val)
return {str(r).strip().lstrip("/").lower() for r in roles if r}
def _frontend(cfg: EffectiveOidc, qs: dict | None = None, fragment: str | None = None) -> str:
base = cfg.post_login_redirect or "/"
url = base
if qs:
url += ("&" if "?" in base else "?") + urlencode(qs)
if fragment:
url += "#" + fragment
return url
# ---- public auth config ---------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/config")
def auth_config(db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
cfg = get_effective_oidc(db)
return {
"oidc_enabled": cfg.configured,
"oidc_only": bool(settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY),
"password_login": not bool(settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY),
"oidc_login_url": "/auth/oidc/login",
}
# ---- sign-in / link flows -------------------------------------------------
@router.get("/oidc/login")
async def oidc_login(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
cfg = get_effective_oidc(db)
oidc = _client(cfg)
request.session.pop("hf_oidc_uid", None)
request.session["hf_oidc_mode"] = "login"
return await oidc.authorize_redirect(request, cfg.redirect_uri)
@router.get("/oidc/link")
async def oidc_link(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user)):
if settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Self-service linking is disabled in OIDC-only mode")
cfg = get_effective_oidc(db)
oidc = _client(cfg)
request.session["hf_oidc_mode"] = "link"
request.session["hf_oidc_uid"] = current_user.id
return await oidc.authorize_redirect(request, cfg.redirect_uri)
@router.get("/oidc/callback")
async def oidc_callback(request: Request, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
cfg = get_effective_oidc(db)
oidc = _client(cfg)
mode = request.session.pop("hf_oidc_mode", "login")
link_uid = request.session.pop("hf_oidc_uid", None)
try:
token = await oidc.authorize_access_token(request)
except Exception:
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "exchange_failed"}))
claims = token.get("userinfo") or {}
if not claims:
try:
claims = await oidc.userinfo(token=token)
except Exception:
claims = {}
subject = claims.get("sub")
issuer = claims.get("iss") or cfg.issuer
if not subject:
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "no_subject"}))
if mode == "link":
if settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY or link_uid is None:
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "link_not_allowed"}))
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == link_uid).first()
if not user:
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "user_gone"}))
clash = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
models.User.oidc_subject == subject,
models.User.id != user.id,
).first()
if clash:
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "already_bound"}))
user.oidc_issuer = issuer
user.oidc_subject = subject
db.commit()
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_linked": "1"}))
user = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
models.User.oidc_subject == subject,
).first()
# OIDC-only bootstrap: before any admin is linked, an IdP user whose
# token carries the configured admin role auto-connects to the unbound
# hf admin. Self-closes once any admin is bound.
if user is None and settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY:
any_admin_bound = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.is_admin == True, # noqa: E712
models.User.oidc_subject.isnot(None),
).first()
if not any_admin_bound and cfg.admin_role.lower() in _collect_roles(claims, token):
taken = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
models.User.oidc_subject == subject,
).first()
if taken is None:
boot = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.is_admin == True, # noqa: E712
models.User.is_active == True, # noqa: E712
models.User.oidc_subject.is_(None),
).order_by(models.User.id).first()
if boot is not None:
boot.oidc_issuer = issuer
boot.oidc_subject = subject
db.commit()
logger.info("OIDC bootstrap: auto-connected admin '%s' via admin role", boot.username)
user = boot
if not user or not user.is_active or user.username in ("acc-mgr", "deleted-user"):
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, {"oidc_error": "not_linked"}))
access_token = create_access_token(
data={"sub": str(user.id)},
expires_delta=timedelta(minutes=settings.ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES),
)
return RedirectResponse(_frontend(cfg, fragment=urlencode({"token": access_token})))
# ---- admin: OIDC provider settings ----------------------------------------
def _require_admin_any(current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)) -> models.User:
"""Admin via JWT OR API key. The API-key path is the recovery channel
when OIDC-only mode is on and OIDC is not yet/incorrectly configured."""
if not getattr(current_user, "is_admin", False):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin privileges required")
return current_user
class OidcSettingsIn(BaseModel):
enabled: bool | None = None
issuer: str | None = None
client_id: str | None = None
client_secret: str | None = None # blank/omitted = keep existing
redirect_uri: str | None = None
scopes: str | None = None
post_login_redirect: str | None = None
admin_role: str | None = None
class OidcSettingsOut(BaseModel):
enabled: bool
issuer: str | None
client_id: str | None
has_client_secret: bool
redirect_uri: str | None
scopes: str | None
post_login_redirect: str | None
admin_role: str
oidc_only: bool # read-only (deploy env)
effective_enabled: bool # provider actually usable
source: str # "db" or "env"
@router.get("/oidc/settings", response_model=OidcSettingsOut)
def get_oidc_settings(db: Session = Depends(get_db), _: models.User = Depends(_require_admin_any)):
row = db.query(OidcSettings).filter(OidcSettings.id == 1).first()
cfg = get_effective_oidc(db)
return OidcSettingsOut(
enabled=bool(row.enabled) if row else bool(settings.OIDC_ENABLED),
issuer=(row.issuer if row else None) or settings.OIDC_ISSUER or None,
client_id=(row.client_id if row else None) or settings.OIDC_CLIENT_ID or None,
has_client_secret=bool((row.client_secret if row else None) or settings.OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET),
redirect_uri=(row.redirect_uri if row else None) or settings.OIDC_REDIRECT_URI or None,
scopes=(row.scopes if row else None) or settings.OIDC_SCOPES or None,
post_login_redirect=(row.post_login_redirect if row else None) or settings.OIDC_POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT or None,
admin_role=cfg.admin_role,
oidc_only=bool(settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY),
effective_enabled=cfg.configured,
source="db" if row else "env",
)
@router.put("/oidc/settings", response_model=OidcSettingsOut)
def update_oidc_settings(payload: OidcSettingsIn, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(_require_admin_any)):
row = db.query(OidcSettings).filter(OidcSettings.id == 1).first()
if row is None:
row = OidcSettings(id=1, enabled=False)
db.add(row)
if payload.enabled is not None:
row.enabled = payload.enabled
if payload.issuer is not None:
row.issuer = payload.issuer.strip() or None
if payload.client_id is not None:
row.client_id = payload.client_id.strip() or None
# client_secret: only overwrite when a non-empty value is supplied
if payload.client_secret:
row.client_secret = payload.client_secret
if payload.redirect_uri is not None:
row.redirect_uri = payload.redirect_uri.strip() or None
if payload.scopes is not None:
row.scopes = payload.scopes.strip() or None
if payload.post_login_redirect is not None:
row.post_login_redirect = payload.post_login_redirect.strip() or None
if payload.admin_role is not None:
row.admin_role = payload.admin_role.strip() or None
db.commit()
_invalidate_client()
return get_oidc_settings(db=db, _=_)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
"""ScheduleType API router.
CRUD for schedule types (work/entertainment time periods)
and agent schedule type assignment.
"""
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Header
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from typing import List
from app.core.config import get_db
from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey
from app.models.models import User
from app.models.agent import Agent
from app.models.schedule_type import ScheduleType
from app.models.role_permission import Permission, RolePermission
from app.schemas.schedule_type import (
ScheduleTypeCreate,
ScheduleTypeUpdate,
ScheduleTypeResponse,
AgentScheduleTypeAssign,
)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/schedule-types", tags=["ScheduleTypes"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Permission helpers
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _has_permission(db: Session, user: User, permission_name: str) -> bool:
if user.is_admin:
return True
if not user.role_id:
return False
return (
db.query(RolePermission)
.join(Permission)
.filter(
RolePermission.role_id == user.role_id,
Permission.name == permission_name,
)
.first()
is not None
)
def _require_schedule_read(db: Session, user: User) -> User:
if not _has_permission(db, user, "schedule_type.read"):
raise HTTPException(403, "Permission denied: schedule_type.read")
return user
def _require_schedule_manage(db: Session, user: User) -> User:
if not _has_permission(db, user, "schedule_type.manage"):
raise HTTPException(403, "Permission denied: schedule_type.manage")
return user
def _attach_derived(st: ScheduleType) -> ScheduleType:
"""Attach derived fields (maintenance_duration_minutes) so the
pydantic ScheduleTypeResponse picks them up via from_attributes.
Pydantic with from_attributes reads attributes off the ORM object;
setting a transient attr here avoids having to convert through dict.
"""
if st is not None:
st.maintenance_duration_minutes = st.compute_maintenance_duration()
return st
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Schedule Type CRUD
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get(
"/",
response_model=List[ScheduleTypeResponse],
summary="List all schedule types",
)
def list_schedule_types(
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_read(db, current_user)
return [_attach_derived(st) for st in db.query(ScheduleType).all()]
@router.post(
"/",
response_model=ScheduleTypeResponse,
summary="Create a schedule type",
)
def create_schedule_type(
payload: ScheduleTypeCreate,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
existing = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.name == payload.name).first()
if existing:
raise HTTPException(409, f"Schedule type '{payload.name}' already exists")
st = ScheduleType(
name=payload.name,
work_from=payload.work_from,
work_to=payload.work_to,
entertainment_from=payload.entertainment_from,
entertainment_to=payload.entertainment_to,
maintenance_from=payload.maintenance_from,
maintenance_to=payload.maintenance_to,
)
db.add(st)
db.commit()
db.refresh(st)
return _attach_derived(st)
@router.patch(
"/{schedule_type_id}",
response_model=ScheduleTypeResponse,
summary="Update a schedule type",
)
def update_schedule_type(
schedule_type_id: int,
payload: ScheduleTypeUpdate,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
st = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.id == schedule_type_id).first()
if not st:
raise HTTPException(404, "Schedule type not found")
update_fields = payload.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)
for field, value in update_fields.items():
setattr(st, field, value)
# Re-validate maintenance after merge (partial updates can put the row
# into an invalid window combo that the pydantic schema couldn't catch
# because it only saw one field).
from app.schemas.schedule_type import _validate_maintenance_window
try:
_validate_maintenance_window(st.maintenance_from, st.maintenance_to)
except ValueError as e:
db.rollback()
raise HTTPException(422, str(e))
db.commit()
db.refresh(st)
return _attach_derived(st)
@router.delete(
"/{schedule_type_id}",
summary="Delete a schedule type",
)
def delete_schedule_type(
schedule_type_id: int,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
st = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.id == schedule_type_id).first()
if not st:
raise HTTPException(404, "Schedule type not found")
# Check if any agents are using this schedule type
agents_using = db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.schedule_type_id == schedule_type_id).count()
if agents_using > 0:
raise HTTPException(
409,
f"Cannot delete: {agents_using} agent(s) are assigned to this schedule type",
)
db.delete(st)
db.commit()
return {"ok": True, "deleted": schedule_type_id}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Agent schedule type assignment (agent-facing, uses X-Agent-ID header)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get(
"/agent/me",
response_model=ScheduleTypeResponse | None,
summary="Get my schedule type",
)
def get_my_schedule_type(
x_agent_id: str = Header(..., alias="X-Agent-ID"),
x_claw_identifier: str = Header(..., alias="X-Claw-Identifier"),
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
):
agent = (
db.query(Agent)
.filter(Agent.agent_id == x_agent_id, Agent.claw_identifier == x_claw_identifier)
.first()
)
if not agent:
raise HTTPException(404, "Agent not found")
if not agent.schedule_type_id:
return None
st = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.id == agent.schedule_type_id).first()
return _attach_derived(st) if st else None
@router.put(
"/agent/{agent_id}/assign",
summary="Assign a schedule type to an agent",
)
def assign_schedule_type(
agent_id: str,
payload: AgentScheduleTypeAssign,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
agent = db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.agent_id == agent_id).first()
if not agent:
raise HTTPException(404, f"Agent '{agent_id}' not found")
st = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.name == payload.schedule_type_name).first()
if not st:
raise HTTPException(404, f"Schedule type '{payload.schedule_type_name}' not found")
agent.schedule_type_id = st.id
db.commit()
return {"ok": True, "agent_id": agent_id, "schedule_type": st.name}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
"""Special-slot CRUD for a ScheduleType (admin-only).
A "special slot" is a recurring slot template tied to a ScheduleType.
The system materialises one `time_slots` row per agent on that
schedule_type per date, scheduled inside the schedule_type's
maintenance window. Materialised rows are `is_admin_locked=true` —
agents can complete / abort / pause / resume them but cannot move
or cancel them.
All endpoints require `schedule_type.manage` (admin auto-grants).
"""
from typing import List
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.core.config import get_db
from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey
from app.models.models import User
from app.models.role_permission import Permission, RolePermission
from app.models.schedule_type import ScheduleType
from app.models.schedule_type_special_slot import ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot
from app.schemas.schedule_type_special_slot import (
SpecialSlotCreate,
SpecialSlotUpdate,
SpecialSlotResponse,
)
router = APIRouter(prefix="/schedule-types", tags=["ScheduleTypes"])
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Permission helpers — mirror schedule_type.py's local helpers so this router
# doesn't have to depend on internal symbols of the other router.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _has_permission(db: Session, user: User, permission_name: str) -> bool:
if user.is_admin:
return True
if not user.role_id:
return False
return (
db.query(RolePermission)
.join(Permission)
.filter(
RolePermission.role_id == user.role_id,
Permission.name == permission_name,
)
.first()
is not None
)
def _require_schedule_manage(db: Session, user: User) -> User:
if not _has_permission(db, user, "schedule_type.manage"):
raise HTTPException(403, "Permission denied: schedule_type.manage")
return user
def _require_schedule_read(db: Session, user: User) -> User:
if not _has_permission(db, user, "schedule_type.read"):
raise HTTPException(403, "Permission denied: schedule_type.read")
return user
def _fetch_schedule_type(db: Session, schedule_type_id: int) -> ScheduleType:
st = db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.id == schedule_type_id).first()
if not st:
raise HTTPException(404, f"ScheduleType {schedule_type_id} not found")
return st
def _validate_fits_window(
minute_in_window: int,
estimated_duration: int,
maintenance_duration_minutes: int,
) -> None:
"""Reject special slots that wouldn't fit inside the parent's maintenance window."""
if minute_in_window + estimated_duration > maintenance_duration_minutes:
raise HTTPException(
422,
(
f"special slot does not fit in maintenance window: "
f"minute_in_window={minute_in_window} + "
f"estimated_duration={estimated_duration} > "
f"maintenance window {maintenance_duration_minutes}min"
),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@router.get(
"/{schedule_type_id}/special-slots",
response_model=List[SpecialSlotResponse],
summary="List special slots for a schedule type",
)
def list_special_slots(
schedule_type_id: int,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_read(db, current_user)
_fetch_schedule_type(db, schedule_type_id)
return (
db.query(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot)
.filter(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.schedule_type_id == schedule_type_id)
.order_by(
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.minute_in_window.asc(),
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.id.asc(),
)
.all()
)
@router.post(
"/{schedule_type_id}/special-slots",
response_model=SpecialSlotResponse,
summary="Create a special slot for a schedule type (admin)",
)
def create_special_slot(
schedule_type_id: int,
payload: SpecialSlotCreate,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
st = _fetch_schedule_type(db, schedule_type_id)
_validate_fits_window(payload.minute_in_window, payload.estimated_duration, st.compute_maintenance_duration())
dup = (
db.query(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot)
.filter(
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.schedule_type_id == schedule_type_id,
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.name == payload.name,
)
.first()
)
if dup:
raise HTTPException(
409,
f"special slot '{payload.name}' already exists for schedule_type {schedule_type_id}",
)
slot = ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot(
schedule_type_id=schedule_type_id,
name=payload.name,
description=payload.description,
minute_in_window=payload.minute_in_window,
estimated_duration=payload.estimated_duration,
priority=payload.priority,
event_data=payload.event_data,
is_active=payload.is_active,
created_by_user_id=current_user.id,
)
db.add(slot)
db.commit()
db.refresh(slot)
return slot
@router.patch(
"/{schedule_type_id}/special-slots/{slot_id}",
response_model=SpecialSlotResponse,
summary="Update a special slot (admin)",
)
def update_special_slot(
schedule_type_id: int,
slot_id: int,
payload: SpecialSlotUpdate,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
slot = (
db.query(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot)
.filter(
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.id == slot_id,
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.schedule_type_id == schedule_type_id,
)
.first()
)
if not slot:
raise HTTPException(404, "Special slot not found")
update_fields = payload.model_dump(exclude_unset=True)
next_min = update_fields.get("minute_in_window", slot.minute_in_window)
next_dur = update_fields.get("estimated_duration", slot.estimated_duration)
parent = _fetch_schedule_type(db, schedule_type_id)
_validate_fits_window(next_min, next_dur, parent.compute_maintenance_duration())
for field, value in update_fields.items():
setattr(slot, field, value)
db.commit()
db.refresh(slot)
return slot
@router.delete(
"/{schedule_type_id}/special-slots/{slot_id}",
summary="Delete a special slot (admin)",
)
def delete_special_slot(
schedule_type_id: int,
slot_id: int,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
_require_schedule_manage(db, current_user)
slot = (
db.query(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot)
.filter(
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.id == slot_id,
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.schedule_type_id == schedule_type_id,
)
.first()
)
if not slot:
raise HTTPException(404, "Special slot not found")
db.delete(slot)
db.commit()
return {"ok": True, "deleted": slot_id}

View File

@@ -576,8 +576,10 @@ def take_task(
# ---- Assignment ----
@router.post("/tasks/{task_code}/assign")
def assign_task(task_code: str, assignee_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def assign_task(task_code: str, assignee_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
task = _resolve_task(db, task_code)
ensure_can_edit_task(db, current_user.id, task)
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == assignee_id).first()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
@@ -765,7 +767,8 @@ def batch_transition(
@router.post("/tasks/batch/assign")
def batch_assign(data: BatchAssign, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
def batch_assign(data: BatchAssign, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == data.assignee_id).first()
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Assignee not found")
@@ -773,6 +776,7 @@ def batch_assign(data: BatchAssign, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
for task_code in data.task_codes:
task = db.query(Task).filter(Task.task_code == task_code).first()
if task:
ensure_can_edit_task(db, current_user.id, task)
task.assignee_id = data.assignee_id
updated.append(task.task_code)
db.commit()

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey, get_password_hash
from app.core.config import get_db
from app.core.config import get_db, settings
from app.init_wizard import DELETED_USER_USERNAME
from app.models import models
from app.models.agent import Agent
from app.models.role_permission import Permission, Role, RolePermission
@@ -31,6 +32,8 @@ def _user_response(user: models.User) -> dict:
"role_name": user.role_name,
"agent_id": user.agent.agent_id if user.agent else None,
"discord_user_id": user.discord_user_id,
"oidc_issuer": user.oidc_issuer,
"oidc_subject": user.oidc_subject,
"created_at": user.created_at,
}
return data
@@ -110,7 +113,13 @@ def create_user(
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="agent_id already in use")
assigned_role = _resolve_user_role(db, user.role_id)
hashed_password = get_password_hash(user.password) if user.password else None
# In OIDC-only mode, ignore any supplied password: the user is created
# passwordless (cannot password-login) and is expected to sign in via a
# bound OIDC identity. API keys still work for such users.
if settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY:
hashed_password = None
else:
hashed_password = get_password_hash(user.password) if user.password else None
db_user = models.User(
username=user.username,
email=user.email,
@@ -190,7 +199,7 @@ def update_user(
if payload.full_name is not None:
user.full_name = payload.full_name
if payload.password is not None and payload.password.strip():
if payload.password is not None and payload.password.strip() and not settings.HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY:
user.hashed_password = get_password_hash(payload.password)
if payload.role_id is not None:
@@ -212,6 +221,151 @@ def update_user(
return _user_response(user)
@router.patch("/{identifier}/bind-agent", response_model=schemas.UserResponse)
def bind_agent(
identifier: str,
payload: schemas.UserBindAgentRequest,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
_: models.User = Depends(require_account_creator),
):
"""Bind an existing user to (agent_id, claw_identifier).
Backfill path for users that were created via `hf user create` before
the cli supported `--agent-id` / `--claw-identifier` flags. Creates
the `agents` row that should have been written at user-create time.
Idempotent: if the user is already bound to the same
(agent_id, claw_identifier), returns the user unchanged (200, no-op).
Rejects (409) if:
- the user is bound to a DIFFERENT (agent_id, claw_identifier)
- the requested agent_id is already in use by another user
Permission: account.create (admin auto-grants) — same gate as
POST /users so the surface stays symmetric.
"""
user = _find_user_by_id_or_username(db, identifier)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
existing_agent_for_user = db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.user_id == user.id).first()
if existing_agent_for_user:
if (
existing_agent_for_user.agent_id == payload.agent_id
and existing_agent_for_user.claw_identifier == payload.claw_identifier
):
# idempotent re-bind
return _user_response(user)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail=(
f"User '{user.username}' is already bound to agent "
f"'{existing_agent_for_user.agent_id}' on claw "
f"'{existing_agent_for_user.claw_identifier}'"
),
)
existing_for_agent_id = (
db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.agent_id == payload.agent_id).first()
)
if existing_for_agent_id:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail=f"agent_id '{payload.agent_id}' already in use by another user",
)
db.add(
Agent(
user_id=user.id,
agent_id=payload.agent_id,
claw_identifier=payload.claw_identifier,
)
)
db.commit()
db.refresh(user)
return _user_response(user)
_BUILTIN_USERNAMES = {"acc-mgr", DELETED_USER_USERNAME}
def _reassign_user_references(db: Session, old_id: int, new_id: int) -> None:
"""Reassign all foreign key references from old_id to new_id, then delete
records that would be meaningless under deleted-user (api_keys, notifications,
project memberships)."""
from app.models.apikey import APIKey
from app.models.notification import Notification
from app.models.activity import ActivityLog as Activity
from app.models.worklog import WorkLog as WorkLogModel
from app.models.meeting import Meeting, MeetingParticipant
from app.models.task import Task
from app.models.support import Support
from app.models.proposal import Proposal
from app.models.milestone import Milestone
from app.models.calendar import TimeSlot, SchedulePlan
from app.models.minimum_workload import MinimumWorkload
from app.models.essential import Essential
# Delete records that are meaningless without the real user
db.query(APIKey).filter(APIKey.user_id == old_id).delete()
db.query(Notification).filter(Notification.user_id == old_id).delete()
db.query(models.ProjectMember).filter(models.ProjectMember.user_id == old_id).delete()
# Reassign ownership/authorship references
db.query(models.Project).filter(models.Project.owner_id == old_id).update(
{"owner_id": new_id})
db.query(models.Comment).filter(models.Comment.author_id == old_id).update(
{"author_id": new_id})
db.query(Activity).filter(Activity.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
db.query(WorkLogModel).filter(WorkLogModel.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
# Tasks
db.query(Task).filter(Task.reporter_id == old_id).update(
{"reporter_id": new_id})
db.query(Task).filter(Task.assignee_id == old_id).update(
{"assignee_id": new_id})
db.query(Task).filter(Task.created_by_id == old_id).update(
{"created_by_id": new_id})
# Meetings
db.query(Meeting).filter(Meeting.reporter_id == old_id).update(
{"reporter_id": new_id})
db.query(MeetingParticipant).filter(MeetingParticipant.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
# Support
db.query(Support).filter(Support.reporter_id == old_id).update(
{"reporter_id": new_id})
db.query(Support).filter(Support.assignee_id == old_id).update(
{"assignee_id": new_id})
# Proposals
db.query(Proposal).filter(Proposal.created_by_id == old_id).update(
{"created_by_id": new_id})
# Milestones
db.query(Milestone).filter(Milestone.created_by_id == old_id).update(
{"created_by_id": new_id})
# Calendar
db.query(TimeSlot).filter(TimeSlot.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
db.query(SchedulePlan).filter(SchedulePlan.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
# Minimum workload / Essential
db.query(MinimumWorkload).filter(MinimumWorkload.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
db.query(Essential).filter(Essential.created_by_id == old_id).update(
{"created_by_id": new_id})
# Agent profile
db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.user_id == old_id).update(
{"user_id": new_id})
@router.delete("/{identifier}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
def delete_user(
identifier: str,
@@ -223,17 +377,26 @@ def delete_user(
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
if current_user.id == user.id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="You cannot delete your own account")
# Protect built-in accounts from deletion
if user.is_admin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Admin accounts cannot be deleted")
if user.username == "acc-mgr":
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="The acc-mgr account is a built-in account and cannot be deleted")
try:
db.delete(user)
db.commit()
except IntegrityError:
db.rollback()
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="User has related records. Deactivate the account instead.")
if user.username in _BUILTIN_USERNAMES:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"The {user.username} account is a built-in account and cannot be deleted",
)
deleted_user = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.username == DELETED_USER_USERNAME
).first()
if not deleted_user:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Built-in deleted-user account not found. Run init_wizard first.",
)
_reassign_user_references(db, user.id, deleted_user.id)
db.delete(user)
db.commit()
return None
@@ -241,7 +404,7 @@ def delete_user(
def reset_user_apikey(
identifier: str,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user),
current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey),
):
"""Reset (regenerate) a user's API key.
@@ -249,6 +412,8 @@ def reset_user_apikey(
- user.reset-apikey: can reset any user's API key
- user.reset-self-apikey: can reset only own API key
- admin: can reset any user's API key
Accepts both OAuth2 Bearer token and X-API-Key authentication.
"""
import secrets
from app.models.apikey import APIKey
@@ -322,3 +487,92 @@ def list_user_worklogs(
if current_user.id != user.id and not current_user.is_admin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
return db.query(WorkLog).filter(WorkLog.user_id == user.id).order_by(WorkLog.logged_date.desc()).limit(limit).all()
# ---- OIDC identity binding ------------------------------------------------
class OidcBindingRequest(BaseModel):
issuer: str
subject: str
class OidcBindingResponse(BaseModel):
user_id: int
username: str
oidc_issuer: str | None = None
oidc_subject: str | None = None
def _assert_can_manage_oidc_binding(db: Session, caller: models.User, target: models.User) -> None:
"""Global admins may (un)bind anyone. Non-admin account managers may
only operate on non-privileged accounts — never on an admin or another
privileged account — otherwise binding an attacker-controlled OIDC
identity to an admin would be a privilege-escalation primitive."""
if getattr(caller, "is_admin", False):
return
privileged = (
getattr(target, "is_admin", False)
or target.username in ("acc-mgr", "deleted-user")
or _has_global_permission(db, target, "account.create")
or _has_global_permission(db, target, "user.reset-apikey")
)
if privileged:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Only a global admin may manage the OIDC binding of a privileged account",
)
@router.put("/{identifier}/oidc-binding", response_model=OidcBindingResponse)
def bind_user_oidc(
identifier: str,
payload: OidcBindingRequest,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
caller: models.User = Depends(require_account_creator),
):
"""Bind an hf user to an external OIDC identity (issuer + subject).
Admin or account-manager (JWT or API key). Account managers may not
target privileged/admin accounts. One OIDC identity maps to at most
one user."""
issuer = (payload.issuer or "").strip()
subject = (payload.subject or "").strip()
if not issuer or not subject:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="issuer and subject are required")
user = _find_user_by_id_or_username(db, identifier)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
_assert_can_manage_oidc_binding(db, caller, user)
clash = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
models.User.oidc_subject == subject,
models.User.id != user.id,
).first()
if clash:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=f"OIDC identity already bound to user '{clash.username}'")
user.oidc_issuer = issuer
user.oidc_subject = subject
db.commit()
db.refresh(user)
return OidcBindingResponse(user_id=user.id, username=user.username,
oidc_issuer=user.oidc_issuer, oidc_subject=user.oidc_subject)
@router.delete("/{identifier}/oidc-binding", response_model=OidcBindingResponse)
def unbind_user_oidc(
identifier: str,
db: Session = Depends(get_db),
caller: models.User = Depends(require_account_creator),
):
"""Remove a user's OIDC binding. Admin or account-manager; account
managers may not target privileged/admin accounts."""
user = _find_user_by_id_or_username(db, identifier)
if not user:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
_assert_can_manage_oidc_binding(db, caller, user)
user.oidc_issuer = None
user.oidc_subject = None
db.commit()
db.refresh(user)
return OidcBindingResponse(user_id=user.id, username=user.username,
oidc_issuer=None, oidc_subject=None)

View File

@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status, BackgroundTasks
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.core.config import get_db
from app.api.deps import require_admin
from app.models.webhook import Webhook, WebhookLog
from app.schemas.webhook import WebhookCreate, WebhookUpdate, WebhookResponse, WebhookLogResponse
from app.services.webhook import fire_webhooks_sync
router = APIRouter(prefix="/webhooks", tags=["Webhooks"])
# Webhook management is admin-only (registration, inspection, retry, logs).
router = APIRouter(prefix="/webhooks", tags=["Webhooks"], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
@router.post("", response_model=WebhookResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)

View File

@@ -38,12 +38,43 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
ALGORITHM: str = "HS256"
ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES: int = 30
# --- OIDC (generic, OpenID Connect discovery) ---
OIDC_ENABLED: bool = False
OIDC_ISSUER: str = "" # e.g. https://idp.example.com (we use {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration)
OIDC_CLIENT_ID: str = ""
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET: str = ""
OIDC_REDIRECT_URI: str = "" # backend callback, e.g. https://hf-api.example.com/auth/oidc/callback
OIDC_SCOPES: str = "openid email profile"
OIDC_POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT: str = "" # frontend URL to return to (token in fragment). Falls back to "/"
OIDC_ADMIN_ROLE: str = "admin" # OIDC role name that bootstraps the unbound hf admin (OIDC-only)
# When true: no password login at all. Password login endpoint rejects,
# user creation ignores any password (passwordless user that can only use
# API keys / OIDC), and the frontend hides all password UI.
HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY: bool = False
class Config:
env_file = ".env"
settings = Settings()
# Fail fast on a weak/default JWT signing key (prevents token forgery).
_WEAK_SECRETS = {
"change-me-in-production",
"change_me_in_production",
"change-me-use-openssl-rand-hex-32",
"secret",
"changeme",
"",
}
if settings.SECRET_KEY in _WEAK_SECRETS or len(settings.SECRET_KEY) < 32:
raise RuntimeError(
"Insecure SECRET_KEY: set a strong random value "
"(e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`) via the SECRET_KEY env var. "
"Refusing to start with a default/short key."
)
# Resolve DB URL: wizard config volume > env > default
_db_url = _resolve_db_url(settings.DATABASE_URL)
engine = create_engine(_db_url, pool_pre_ping=True)

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.models import models
from app.models.role_permission import Role, Permission, RolePermission
from app.models.oidc_settings import OidcSettings
from app.api.deps import get_password_hash
logger = logging.getLogger("harborforge.init")
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@ _DEV_PERMISSIONS = {
_ACCOUNT_MANAGER_PERMISSIONS = {
"account.create",
"user.reset-apikey",
}
# Role definitions: (name, description, permission_set)
@@ -294,6 +296,83 @@ def init_acc_mgr_user(db: Session) -> models.User | None:
return user
DELETED_USER_USERNAME = "deleted-user"
def init_deleted_user(db: Session) -> models.User | None:
"""Create the built-in deleted-user if not exists.
This user serves as a foreign key sink: when a real user is deleted,
all references are reassigned here instead of cascading deletes.
It has no role (no permissions) and cannot log in.
"""
existing = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.username == DELETED_USER_USERNAME
).first()
if existing:
logger.info("deleted-user already exists (id=%d), skipping", existing.id)
return existing
user = models.User(
username=DELETED_USER_USERNAME,
email="deleted-user@harborforge.internal",
full_name="Deleted User",
hashed_password=None,
is_admin=False,
is_active=False,
role_id=None,
)
db.add(user)
db.commit()
db.refresh(user)
logger.info("Created deleted-user (id=%d)", user.id)
return user
def init_oidc_settings(db: Session, oidc_cfg: dict, admin_user: models.User | None) -> None:
"""Bootstrap OIDC from the wizard config (first init only).
Creates the single oidc_settings row if absent so the deployment comes
up with OIDC configured. If admin_subject is given, binds the bootstrap
admin so it can sign in (critical in OIDC-only mode). Idempotent: an
existing row / existing admin binding is left untouched so later admin
edits via the API are not clobbered on restart."""
if not oidc_cfg:
return
existing = db.query(OidcSettings).filter(OidcSettings.id == 1).first()
if existing is None:
db.add(OidcSettings(
id=1,
enabled=bool(oidc_cfg.get("enabled", True)),
issuer=(oidc_cfg.get("issuer") or "").strip() or None,
client_id=(oidc_cfg.get("client_id") or "").strip() or None,
client_secret=oidc_cfg.get("client_secret") or None,
redirect_uri=(oidc_cfg.get("redirect_uri") or "").strip() or None,
scopes=(oidc_cfg.get("scopes") or "").strip() or None,
post_login_redirect=(oidc_cfg.get("post_login_redirect") or "").strip() or None,
admin_role=(oidc_cfg.get("admin_role") or "").strip() or None,
))
db.commit()
logger.info("OIDC settings bootstrapped from wizard config")
admin_subject = (oidc_cfg.get("admin_subject") or "").strip()
issuer = (oidc_cfg.get("issuer") or "").strip()
if admin_user and admin_subject and issuer and not admin_user.oidc_subject:
clash = db.query(models.User).filter(
models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
models.User.oidc_subject == admin_subject,
models.User.id != admin_user.id,
).first()
if clash:
logger.warning("Admin OIDC subject already bound to '%s'; skipping admin bind", clash.username)
else:
admin_user.oidc_issuer = issuer
admin_user.oidc_subject = admin_subject
db.commit()
logger.info("Bootstrap admin '%s' bound to OIDC subject", admin_user.username)
def run_init(db: Session) -> None:
"""Main initialization entry point. Reads config from shared volume."""
config = load_config()
@@ -318,9 +397,15 @@ def run_init(db: Session) -> None:
# Built-in acc-mgr user (after roles are created)
init_acc_mgr_user(db)
# Built-in deleted-user (foreign key sink for deleted accounts)
init_deleted_user(db)
# Default project
project_cfg = config.get("default_project")
if project_cfg and admin_user:
init_default_project(db, project_cfg, admin_user.id, admin_user.username)
# OIDC bootstrap (provider config + optional bootstrap-admin binding)
init_oidc_settings(db, config.get("oidc") or {}, admin_user)
logger.info("Initialization complete")

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
"""HarborForge API — Agent/人类协同任务管理平台"""
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from starlette.middleware.sessions import SessionMiddleware
from app.core.config import settings
app = FastAPI(
title="HarborForge API",
@@ -17,6 +20,17 @@ app.add_middleware(
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# Short-lived signed session cookie — only used to carry the OIDC
# state/nonce between /auth/oidc/login and the callback.
app.add_middleware(
SessionMiddleware,
secret_key=settings.SECRET_KEY,
session_cookie="hf_oidc",
same_site="lax",
https_only=False,
max_age=600,
)
# Health & version (kept at top level)
@app.get("/health", tags=["System"])
def health_check():
@@ -63,9 +77,13 @@ from app.api.routers.proposes import router as proposes_router # legacy compat
from app.api.routers.milestone_actions import router as milestone_actions_router
from app.api.routers.meetings import router as meetings_router
from app.api.routers.essentials import router as essentials_router
from app.api.routers.schedule_type import router as schedule_type_router
from app.api.routers.schedule_type_special_slot import router as schedule_type_special_slot_router
from app.api.routers.calendar import router as calendar_router
from app.api.routers.oidc import router as oidc_router
app.include_router(auth_router)
app.include_router(oidc_router)
app.include_router(tasks_router)
app.include_router(projects_router)
app.include_router(users_router)
@@ -80,6 +98,8 @@ app.include_router(proposes_router) # legacy compat
app.include_router(milestone_actions_router)
app.include_router(meetings_router)
app.include_router(essentials_router)
app.include_router(schedule_type_router)
app.include_router(schedule_type_special_slot_router)
app.include_router(calendar_router)
@@ -275,6 +295,18 @@ def _migrate_schema():
if _has_table(db, "users") and not _has_column(db, "users", "discord_user_id"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN discord_user_id VARCHAR(32) NULL"))
# --- users OIDC binding (issuer + subject), unique together ---
if _has_table(db, "users") and not _has_column(db, "users", "oidc_issuer"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN oidc_issuer VARCHAR(255) NULL"))
if _has_table(db, "users") and not _has_column(db, "users", "oidc_subject"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN oidc_subject VARCHAR(255) NULL"))
if _has_table(db, "users") and _has_column(db, "users", "oidc_subject"):
_ensure_unique_index(db, "users", "uq_users_oidc_identity", "oidc_issuer, oidc_subject")
# --- oidc_settings.admin_role (added after the table shipped) ---
if _has_table(db, "oidc_settings") and not _has_column(db, "oidc_settings", "admin_role"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE oidc_settings ADD COLUMN admin_role VARCHAR(128) NULL"))
# --- monitored_servers.api_key for heartbeat v2 ---
if _has_table(db, "monitored_servers") and not _has_column(db, "monitored_servers", "api_key"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE monitored_servers ADD COLUMN api_key VARCHAR(64) NULL"))
@@ -363,6 +395,67 @@ def _migrate_schema():
if _has_table(db, "time_slots") and not _has_column(db, "time_slots", "wakeup_sent_at"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE time_slots ADD COLUMN wakeup_sent_at DATETIME NULL"))
# --- agents: add schedule_type_id FK ---
if _has_table(db, "agents") and not _has_column(db, "agents", "schedule_type_id"):
db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE agents ADD COLUMN schedule_type_id INTEGER NULL"))
# --- schedule_types: add maintenance_from / maintenance_to ---
# Default 8:009:00 UTC for existing rows; the maintenance
# duration invariant (1-180min) is enforced at the schema
# level for any NEW rows by ScheduleTypeCreate validator.
if _has_table(db, "schedule_types"):
if not _has_column(db, "schedule_types", "maintenance_from"):
db.execute(text(
"ALTER TABLE schedule_types ADD COLUMN maintenance_from INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 8"
))
if not _has_column(db, "schedule_types", "maintenance_to"):
db.execute(text(
"ALTER TABLE schedule_types ADD COLUMN maintenance_to INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 9"
))
# --- minutes-since-midnight migration (PR #21+) ---
# The 6 schedule_type window columns used to hold *hours*
# (0-23). PR #21 changed semantics to *minutes since UTC
# midnight* (0-1439). Detect the legacy regime by checking
# if ANY row has all 6 values ≤ 23 — if so, multiply each
# by 60 to convert. Idempotent: post-conversion values are
# all ≥ 0 and usually well above 23, so guard never fires
# twice.
row = db.execute(text(
"SELECT MAX(GREATEST(work_from, work_to, entertainment_from, entertainment_to, maintenance_from, maintenance_to)) AS m "
"FROM schedule_types"
)).fetchone()
if row is not None and row.m is not None and row.m <= 23:
db.execute(text(
"UPDATE schedule_types SET "
" work_from = work_from * 60, "
" work_to = work_to * 60, "
" entertainment_from = entertainment_from * 60, "
" entertainment_to = entertainment_to * 60, "
" maintenance_from = maintenance_from * 60, "
" maintenance_to = maintenance_to * 60"
))
# --- time_slots: admin-locked + special_slot pointer ---
if _has_table(db, "time_slots"):
if not _has_column(db, "time_slots", "is_admin_locked"):
db.execute(text(
"ALTER TABLE time_slots ADD COLUMN is_admin_locked TINYINT(1) NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"
))
if not _has_column(db, "time_slots", "special_slot_id"):
db.execute(text(
"ALTER TABLE time_slots ADD COLUMN special_slot_id INTEGER NULL"
))
# Index for the materialiser's idempotency lookup
db.execute(text(
"CREATE INDEX idx_time_slots_special_slot_id ON time_slots (special_slot_id)"
))
# --- schedule_type_special_slots: create-table is handled by
# Base.metadata.create_all on first boot; no migration needed here
# because there is no legacy table to evolve. Future schema bumps
# to that table go in this block.
db.commit()
except Exception as e:
db.rollback()
@@ -397,7 +490,7 @@ def _sync_default_user_roles(db):
@app.on_event("startup")
def startup():
from app.core.config import Base, engine, SessionLocal
from app.models import models, webhook, apikey, activity, milestone, notification, worklog, monitor, role_permission, task, support, meeting, proposal, propose, essential, agent, calendar, minimum_workload
from app.models import models, webhook, apikey, activity, milestone, notification, worklog, monitor, role_permission, task, support, meeting, proposal, propose, essential, agent, calendar, minimum_workload, schedule_type, schedule_type_special_slot, oidc_settings
Base.metadata.create_all(bind=engine)
_migrate_schema()

View File

@@ -131,6 +131,15 @@ class Agent(Base):
comment="rate_limit | billing — why the agent is exhausted",
)
# -- schedule type ------------------------------------------------------
schedule_type_id = Column(
Integer,
ForeignKey("schedule_types.id"),
nullable=True,
comment="FK to schedule_types — defines work/entertainment periods",
)
# -- timestamps ---------------------------------------------------------
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
@@ -138,3 +147,4 @@ class Agent(Base):
# -- relationships ------------------------------------------------------
user = relationship("User", back_populates="agent", uselist=False)
schedule_type = relationship("ScheduleType", lazy="joined")

View File

@@ -178,11 +178,37 @@ class TimeSlot(Base):
comment="Source plan if materialized from a SchedulePlan; set NULL on edit/cancel",
)
# -----------------------------------------------------------------
# Admin-locked slots are materialised from a ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot
# template. The agent can complete / abort / pause / resume them but
# cannot edit their time, type, duration, or cancel them outright —
# the slot exists because admin decided every agent on the parent
# schedule_type should run it. See `_apply_agent_slot_update` for
# the enforcement.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------
is_admin_locked = Column(
Boolean,
nullable=False,
server_default="0",
comment="True for slots materialised from a schedule_type special slot template.",
)
# Pointer back to the template that materialised this slot. NULL for
# all user-created or plan-generated slots. Lets us cascade updates
# and surface 'why is this on my calendar' to the agent.
special_slot_id = Column(
Integer,
ForeignKey("schedule_type_special_slots.id", ondelete="SET NULL"),
nullable=True,
index=True,
)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now())
# relationship ----------------------------------------------------------
plan = relationship("SchedulePlan", back_populates="materialized_slots")
special_slot = relationship("ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Text, DateTime, ForeignKey, Enum, Boolean, JSON, Time
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Text, DateTime, ForeignKey, Enum, Boolean, JSON, Time, UniqueConstraint
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.core.config import Base
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ class Project(Base):
class User(Base):
__tablename__ = "users"
__table_args__ = (
UniqueConstraint("oidc_issuer", "oidc_subject", name="uq_users_oidc_identity"),
)
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True)
username = Column(String(50), unique=True, nullable=False)
@@ -73,6 +76,10 @@ class User(Base):
hashed_password = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
full_name = Column(String(100), nullable=True)
discord_user_id = Column(String(32), nullable=True)
# OIDC binding: an hf user is linked to at most one external OIDC identity
# (issuer + subject). Unique together so one IdP identity maps to one user.
oidc_issuer = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
oidc_subject = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True)
is_admin = Column(Boolean, default=False)
role_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("roles.id"), nullable=True)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, Boolean, DateTime
from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.core.config import Base
class OidcSettings(Base):
"""Single-row (id=1) runtime OIDC configuration.
When a row exists its non-empty fields override the OIDC_* env vars,
so the provider can be configured from the admin UI without a redeploy.
"""
__tablename__ = "oidc_settings"
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, default=1)
enabled = Column(Boolean, default=False, nullable=False)
issuer = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
client_id = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
client_secret = Column(String(512), nullable=True)
redirect_uri = Column(String(512), nullable=True)
scopes = Column(String(255), nullable=True)
post_login_redirect = Column(String(512), nullable=True)
# OIDC role name that, in OIDC-only mode, auto-connects an unbound
# hf admin on first login (bootstrap). Default "admin".
admin_role = Column(String(128), nullable=True)
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now(), onupdate=func.now())

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
"""ScheduleType model — defines work/entertainment/maintenance time periods.
Each ScheduleType defines the daily work, entertainment, and maintenance
windows for agents who reference this type. All bounds are stored as
**minutes-since-UTC-midnight** (0-1439 inclusive) so half-hour and other
sub-hour boundaries are exact.
Maintenance window length is variable (1-180 minutes) and admin-owned;
agent slots cannot intersect it (see `app/api/routers/calendar.py`).
Historical note: pre-PR #21 the columns held *hours* (0-23) and the
maintenance window was hard-fixed at exactly 1 hour. The additive
migration in `_migrate_schema()` multiplies legacy values by 60 so
existing rows convert transparently.
"""
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, DateTime
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.core.config import Base
class ScheduleType(Base):
"""Work/entertainment/maintenance period definition."""
__tablename__ = "schedule_types"
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True)
name = Column(
String(64),
nullable=False,
unique=True,
comment="Human-readable schedule type name (e.g., 'standard', 'night-shift')",
)
# Minutes since UTC midnight, 0-1439 inclusive.
work_from = Column(Integer, nullable=False, comment="Work period start (minutes since UTC midnight)")
work_to = Column(Integer, nullable=False, comment="Work period end (minutes since UTC midnight)")
entertainment_from = Column(Integer, nullable=False, comment="Entertainment start (minutes since UTC midnight)")
entertainment_to = Column(Integer, nullable=False, comment="Entertainment end (minutes since UTC midnight)")
# Maintenance window — admin-owned, variable length (1-180 min).
# Default 8:009:00 UTC = 480540 minutes for existing rows.
maintenance_from = Column(
Integer,
nullable=False,
server_default="480",
comment="Maintenance start (minutes since UTC midnight, default 480 = 8:00 UTC).",
)
maintenance_to = Column(
Integer,
nullable=False,
server_default="540",
comment="Maintenance end (minutes since UTC midnight, default 540 = 9:00 UTC). Duration ((to-from) mod 1440) must be in [1, 180].",
)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now())
# relationship ---------------------------------------------------
special_slots = relationship(
"ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot",
back_populates="schedule_type",
cascade="all, delete-orphan",
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
# Convenience methods used by the API layer + materialiser.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------
def compute_maintenance_duration(self) -> int:
"""Maintenance window length in minutes (handles 23→0 wrap)."""
return (self.maintenance_to - self.maintenance_from) % 1440 or 1440
def window_contains(self, start_min: int, end_min: int, win_from: int, win_to: int) -> bool:
"""True if [start_min, end_min) intersects [win_from, win_to) (handles wrap)."""
# Normalise into [0, 1440) — same logic as the helper in calendar.py.
if win_to > win_from:
return start_min < win_to and end_min > win_from
# wrap window crosses midnight: [win_from..1440) [0..win_to)
return start_min < win_to or end_min > win_from

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
"""ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot — admin-managed slot template tied to a ScheduleType.
A "special slot" is a recurring slot template that the system materializes
into every matching agent's `time_slots` row each day. It exists for tasks
that admin wants to enforce across an entire schedule type cohort, e.g.:
* `plan-schedule` — daily planning slot all agents on this type must run
* `secret-rotation-window` — security maintenance
* `policy-update` — read updated agent policies
Rules:
* Only admins (`schedule_type.manage` permission) may create / edit /
delete special slots.
* The slot's `minute_in_window` offset must place it inside the parent
schedule_type's maintenance window (`maintenance_from..maintenance_from+59`).
* Materialised `time_slots` rows from a special slot carry
`is_admin_locked=true` so the agent-side `PATCH .../agent-update`
refuses status/time edits other than complete/abort/pause/resume.
* Materialisation produces one `time_slots` row per agent using this
schedule_type per date, with `slot_type=system`, `event_type=system_event`,
`event_data={"special_slot_id": <id>, "special_slot_name": "<name>",
"source": "schedule_type_special_slot", ...admin-supplied...}`.
"""
from sqlalchemy import Column, Integer, String, ForeignKey, JSON, DateTime, Boolean, UniqueConstraint
from sqlalchemy.orm import relationship
from sqlalchemy.sql import func
from app.core.config import Base
class ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot(Base):
"""Admin-managed daily slot template attached to a ScheduleType."""
__tablename__ = "schedule_type_special_slots"
__table_args__ = (
# One slot template per (schedule_type, name) so admin can use the
# `name` field as a stable, human-readable identifier for the cohort.
UniqueConstraint("schedule_type_id", "name", name="uq_special_slot_type_name"),
)
id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True)
schedule_type_id = Column(
Integer,
ForeignKey("schedule_types.id", ondelete="CASCADE"),
nullable=False,
index=True,
)
name = Column(
String(64),
nullable=False,
comment="Short identifier, e.g. 'plan-schedule', 'secret-rotation'",
)
description = Column(
String(512),
nullable=True,
comment="Human-readable note on what this slot is for",
)
minute_in_window = Column(
Integer,
nullable=False,
server_default="0",
comment=(
"Minute offset (0-59) inside the schedule_type maintenance window. "
"The materialised time_slot's scheduled_at becomes "
"maintenance_from:minute_in_window:00 UTC."
),
)
estimated_duration = Column(
Integer,
nullable=False,
server_default="15",
comment="Duration in minutes. Must fit inside the maintenance window.",
)
priority = Column(
Integer,
nullable=False,
server_default="50",
comment="Wake priority — higher value wakes first if multiple slots are due.",
)
event_data = Column(
JSON,
nullable=True,
comment=(
"Admin-supplied JSON payload that gets merged into every "
"materialised slot's event_data. Use this to pass a workflow "
"tag, suggested_workload, or any other context the agent "
"should see in its wakeup message."
),
)
is_active = Column(
Boolean,
nullable=False,
server_default="1",
comment="Soft-disable without deleting; inactive templates are skipped during materialisation.",
)
created_by_user_id = Column(
Integer,
ForeignKey("users.id"),
nullable=False,
)
created_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), server_default=func.now())
updated_at = Column(DateTime(timezone=True), onupdate=func.now())
# relationship ---------------------------------------------------
schedule_type = relationship("ScheduleType", back_populates="special_slots")

View File

@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ class TimeSlotResponse(BaseModel):
priority: int
status: str
plan_id: Optional[int] = None
is_admin_locked: bool = False
special_slot_id: Optional[int] = None
created_at: Optional[dt_datetime] = None
updated_at: Optional[dt_datetime] = None
@@ -226,6 +228,8 @@ class CalendarSlotItem(BaseModel):
priority: int
status: str
plan_id: Optional[int] = None
is_admin_locked: bool = False
special_slot_id: Optional[int] = None
created_at: Optional[dt_datetime] = None
updated_at: Optional[dt_datetime] = None

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
"""Schemas for ScheduleType CRUD.
All `*_from` / `*_to` values are **minutes since UTC midnight** (0-1439).
A maintenance window of variable length is allowed (1-180 minutes,
handles 23→0 wrap).
"""
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, model_validator
from typing import Optional
_MAX_MIN = 1440 # 24 * 60 — exclusive upper bound
def _maintenance_duration(maint_from: int, maint_to: int) -> int:
"""Maintenance window length in minutes; treats from==to as 24h (invalid)."""
return (maint_to - maint_from) % _MAX_MIN or _MAX_MIN
def _validate_maintenance_window(maint_from: int, maint_to: int) -> None:
dur = _maintenance_duration(maint_from, maint_to)
if dur < 1 or dur > 180:
raise ValueError(
f"maintenance window duration must be in [1, 180] minutes; "
f"got {dur} (from={maint_from}, to={maint_to})"
)
def _validate_minute_field(name: str, value: int) -> None:
if value < 0 or value >= _MAX_MIN:
raise ValueError(f"{name} must be in [0, {_MAX_MIN}); got {value}")
class ScheduleTypeCreate(BaseModel):
name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=64)
work_from: int = Field(..., ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN, description="Work start (minutes since UTC midnight, 0-1439)")
work_to: int = Field(..., ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
entertainment_from: int = Field(..., ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
entertainment_to: int = Field(..., ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
maintenance_from: int = Field(480, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN, description="Maintenance start (default 480 = 8:00 UTC)")
maintenance_to: int = Field(540, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN, description="Maintenance end; (to-from) mod 1440 in [1,180]")
@model_validator(mode="after")
def _check_maintenance(self):
_validate_maintenance_window(self.maintenance_from, self.maintenance_to)
return self
class ScheduleTypeUpdate(BaseModel):
name: Optional[str] = Field(None, min_length=1, max_length=64)
work_from: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
work_to: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
entertainment_from: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
entertainment_to: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
maintenance_from: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
maintenance_to: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, lt=_MAX_MIN)
@model_validator(mode="after")
def _check_maintenance(self):
# Only validate when both fields are present together; partial-
# update validation against the merged row happens at apply time.
if self.maintenance_from is not None and self.maintenance_to is not None:
_validate_maintenance_window(self.maintenance_from, self.maintenance_to)
return self
class ScheduleTypeResponse(BaseModel):
id: int
name: str
work_from: int
work_to: int
entertainment_from: int
entertainment_to: int
maintenance_from: int
maintenance_to: int
maintenance_duration_minutes: Optional[int] = None # derived; populated by router
class Config:
from_attributes = True
class AgentScheduleTypeAssign(BaseModel):
schedule_type_name: str = Field(..., description="Name of the schedule type to assign")

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
"""Schemas for ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot CRUD (admin-only)."""
from datetime import datetime
from typing import Any, Optional
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
class SpecialSlotCreate(BaseModel):
name: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=64)
description: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=512)
minute_in_window: int = Field(0, ge=0, le=179, description="Minute offset (0-179) inside the schedule_type maintenance window")
estimated_duration: int = Field(15, ge=1, le=180, description="Duration in minutes; must fit inside the maintenance window (1-180min)")
priority: int = Field(50, ge=0, le=99)
event_data: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = Field(None, description="JSON payload merged into every materialised slot's event_data")
is_active: bool = True
class SpecialSlotUpdate(BaseModel):
name: Optional[str] = Field(None, min_length=1, max_length=64)
description: Optional[str] = Field(None, max_length=512)
minute_in_window: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, le=179)
estimated_duration: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=1, le=180)
priority: Optional[int] = Field(None, ge=0, le=99)
event_data: Optional[dict[str, Any]] = None
is_active: Optional[bool] = None
class SpecialSlotResponse(BaseModel):
id: int
schedule_type_id: int
name: str
description: Optional[str]
minute_in_window: int
estimated_duration: int
priority: int
event_data: Optional[dict[str, Any]]
is_active: bool
created_by_user_id: int
created_at: datetime
class Config:
from_attributes = True

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
from pydantic import BaseModel
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
from typing import Optional, List
from datetime import datetime, time
from enum import Enum
@@ -186,6 +186,19 @@ class UserUpdate(BaseModel):
discord_user_id: Optional[str] = None
class UserBindAgentRequest(BaseModel):
"""Request body for PATCH /users/{identifier}/bind-agent.
Binds an existing user to (agent_id, claw_identifier) by inserting a
row in the `agents` table. Both fields required (mirrors the
create-time invariant in UserCreate). Idempotent: re-binding the same
user to the same (agent_id, claw_identifier) returns the existing
Agent row instead of 409.
"""
agent_id: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=128)
claw_identifier: str = Field(..., min_length=1, max_length=128)
class UserResponse(UserBase):
id: int
is_active: bool
@@ -194,8 +207,10 @@ class UserResponse(UserBase):
role_name: Optional[str] = None
agent_id: Optional[str] = None
discord_user_id: Optional[str] = None
oidc_issuer: Optional[str] = None
oidc_subject: Optional[str] = None
created_at: datetime
class Config:
from_attributes = True

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
"""Materialise schedule_type special slots into per-agent time_slots rows.
A ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot is a template — it lives on the schedule_type.
For an agent on that schedule_type to actually be woken, the system must
emit a row in `time_slots` with `slot_type=system`, `is_admin_locked=true`,
`special_slot_id=<template_id>` for the agent's `user_id` on the target
date. This module is the single materialisation point.
Called from:
* GET /calendar/day — before returning slots, materialise today's special
slots for the calling user.
* GET /calendar/sync — before returning per-claw schedules, materialise
today's special slots for every agent on this claw whose schedule_type
has any active special slot template.
Idempotent: re-running on the same (agent, date, special_slot_template)
is a no-op — uniqueness is enforced via SELECT-then-insert. We do not add
a DB-level unique constraint because the time_slots table is already
indexed by (user_id, date) and an extra composite index is overkill for
the low cardinality of (agents × special-slot-templates) per day.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from datetime import date as date_type, time as time_type
from typing import Iterable
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.models.agent import Agent
from app.models.calendar import TimeSlot, SlotType, SlotStatus, EventType
from app.models.schedule_type import ScheduleType
from app.models.schedule_type_special_slot import ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot
def materialise_special_slots_for_user(
db: Session,
user_id: int,
target_date: date_type,
commit: bool = True,
) -> list[TimeSlot]:
"""Materialise today's special slots for one agent (identified by user_id).
Returns the list of newly created rows (may be empty if all already exist
or the agent has no schedule_type / no active templates).
"""
agent = db.query(Agent).filter(Agent.user_id == user_id).first()
if not agent or not agent.schedule_type_id:
return []
return _materialise_for_agent(db, agent, target_date, commit=commit)
def materialise_special_slots_for_claw(
db: Session,
claw_identifier: str,
target_date: date_type,
commit: bool = True,
) -> list[TimeSlot]:
"""Materialise today's special slots for every agent on a claw instance.
Used by the multi-agent `/calendar/sync` endpoint so plugin-driven
`runSync` cycles see the special slots without each agent having to
hit `/calendar/day` first.
"""
agents = (
db.query(Agent)
.filter(
Agent.claw_identifier == claw_identifier,
Agent.schedule_type_id.isnot(None),
)
.all()
)
created: list[TimeSlot] = []
for agent in agents:
created.extend(_materialise_for_agent(db, agent, target_date, commit=False))
if commit and created:
db.commit()
return created
def _materialise_for_agent(
db: Session,
agent: Agent,
target_date: date_type,
commit: bool,
) -> list[TimeSlot]:
st: ScheduleType | None = (
db.query(ScheduleType).filter(ScheduleType.id == agent.schedule_type_id).first()
)
if not st:
return []
templates: Iterable[ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot] = (
db.query(ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot)
.filter(
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.schedule_type_id == st.id,
ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot.is_active.is_(True),
)
.all()
)
created: list[TimeSlot] = []
for tpl in templates:
if _already_materialised(db, agent.user_id, target_date, tpl.id):
continue
slot = _build_time_slot_from_template(
user_id=agent.user_id,
target_date=target_date,
schedule_type=st,
template=tpl,
)
db.add(slot)
created.append(slot)
if commit and created:
db.commit()
for slot in created:
db.refresh(slot)
return created
def _already_materialised(
db: Session,
user_id: int,
target_date: date_type,
template_id: int,
) -> bool:
return (
db.query(TimeSlot.id)
.filter(
TimeSlot.user_id == user_id,
TimeSlot.date == target_date,
TimeSlot.special_slot_id == template_id,
)
.first()
is not None
)
def _build_time_slot_from_template(
*,
user_id: int,
target_date: date_type,
schedule_type: ScheduleType,
template: ScheduleTypeSpecialSlot,
) -> TimeSlot:
# schedule_type.maintenance_from is minutes-since-UTC-midnight; the
# template's minute_in_window is an offset inside that window. Combined
# offset must fit in [0, 1440) and produce a wall-clock time_type.
total_min = (schedule_type.maintenance_from + template.minute_in_window) % 1440
scheduled_at = time_type(hour=total_min // 60, minute=total_min % 60, second=0)
# Merge admin-supplied event_data with bookkeeping pointers so the
# agent (and ARD) can identify the template at wake time.
merged_event_data = dict(template.event_data or {})
merged_event_data.setdefault("source", "schedule_type_special_slot")
merged_event_data["special_slot_id"] = template.id
merged_event_data["special_slot_name"] = template.name
merged_event_data["schedule_type_id"] = schedule_type.id
merged_event_data["schedule_type_name"] = schedule_type.name
return TimeSlot(
user_id=user_id,
date=target_date,
slot_type=SlotType.SYSTEM,
estimated_duration=template.estimated_duration,
scheduled_at=scheduled_at,
attended=False,
event_type=EventType.SYSTEM_EVENT,
event_data=merged_event_data,
priority=template.priority,
status=SlotStatus.NOT_STARTED,
is_admin_locked=True,
special_slot_id=template.id,
)

View File

@@ -2,12 +2,41 @@ import json
import hmac
import hashlib
import logging
import socket
import ipaddress
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
from app.models.webhook import Webhook, WebhookLog
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _validate_webhook_url(url: str) -> None:
"""Raise ValueError if the URL would target a non-public address (SSRF guard)."""
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
raise ValueError(f"unsupported scheme: {parsed.scheme!r}")
host = parsed.hostname
if not host:
raise ValueError("missing host")
# Resolve every address the host maps to and reject non-global ranges.
try:
infos = socket.getaddrinfo(host, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80))
except socket.gaierror as e:
raise ValueError(f"DNS resolution failed: {e}")
for info in infos:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0])
if (
ip.is_private
or ip.is_loopback
or ip.is_link_local
or ip.is_multicast
or ip.is_reserved
or ip.is_unspecified
):
raise ValueError(f"host resolves to non-public address {ip}")
def fire_webhooks_sync(event: str, payload: dict, project_id: int, db: Session):
"""Find matching webhooks and send payloads (sync version)."""
import httpx
@@ -35,6 +64,8 @@ def fire_webhooks_sync(event: str, payload: dict, project_id: int, db: Session):
payload=payload_json,
)
try:
_validate_webhook_url(wh.url)
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
if wh.secret:
sig = hmac.new(
@@ -42,7 +73,7 @@ def fire_webhooks_sync(event: str, payload: dict, project_id: int, db: Session):
).hexdigest()
headers["X-Webhook-Signature"] = sig
with httpx.Client(timeout=10.0) as client:
with httpx.Client(timeout=10.0, follow_redirects=False) as client:
resp = client.post(wh.url, content=payload_json, headers=headers)
log.response_status = resp.status_code
log.response_body = resp.text[:1000]

99
docs/oidc-test-plan.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
# OIDC 接入 — 测试点描述
覆盖范围OIDC 登录、hf 用户与 OIDC 身份绑定、`HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY`
模式、管理员 OIDC 配置页面。涉及仓库分支 `feature/oidc-login`
`HarborForge.Backend` + `HarborForge.Frontend`)。
“本地状态” 列:✅ 已用真实 Keycloak 在本地栈端到端验证;🟡 已用接口/构建
验证但未走真实 IdP UI⬜ 待测。
## 0. 测试环境
- 后端 `http://127.0.0.1:18000`、前端 `http://127.0.0.1:13000`(本地验证栈)
- IdPKeycloak 容器realm `hf`confidential client `hf-client`
- IdP 测试用户:`tester` / `Test123!`emailVerified=true
- 关键约束:**issuer URL 必须浏览器与后端容器都能用同一地址访问**
(否则 token `iss` 校验失败)。本地用宿主机 IP 统一两端。
- 配置项(运行时 env 或 DBDB 覆盖 env
`OIDC_ENABLED / OIDC_ISSUER / OIDC_CLIENT_ID / OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET /
OIDC_REDIRECT_URI / OIDC_SCOPES / OIDC_POST_LOGIN_REDIRECT`
部署级 `HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY`Docker ARG/ENV前后端均有
## 1. 管理员 OIDC 配置(页面 + API
| # | 测试点 | 步骤 | 预期 | 本地 |
|---|--------|------|------|------|
|1.1|读取初始配置|`GET /auth/oidc/settings`admin|返回 `source=env``has_client_secret=false``effective_enabled` 反映 env|✅|
|1.2|保存配置|`PUT /auth/oidc/settings` 填 issuer/client/secret/redirect/scopes/post_login|200`source=db``effective_enabled=true`|✅|
|1.3|client_secret 只写不回显|保存后再 `GET`|响应无明文 secret`has_client_secret=true`|✅|
|1.4|secret 留空保留原值|`PUT` 不带 `client_secret`|原 secret 不变,登录仍可用|🟡|
|1.5|配置即时生效|保存后 `GET /auth/config`|`oidc_enabled` 立即变化,无需重启|✅|
|1.6|页面仅 admin 可见|非 admin 访问 `/settings/oidc`|被重定向到 `/`侧栏无入口API 返回 401/403|🟡|
|1.7|页面展示 Callback URL|打开 OIDC 设置页|醒目显示需在 IdP 注册的 redirect/callback URL、当前状态与配置来源|🟡|
## 2. OIDC 登录流程(授权码)
| # | 测试点 | 步骤 | 预期 | 本地 |
|---|--------|------|------|------|
|2.1|发起登录|`GET /auth/oidc/login`|302 跳转到 IdP authorize 端点state/nonce 入会话 cookie|✅|
|2.2|IdP 登录成功回跳|在 IdP 输入 `tester/Test123!`|302 回 `…/auth/oidc/callback?code=…&state=…`|✅|
|2.3|回调换码并签发|后端处理 callback|校验 ID token(JWKS)→定位绑定用户→签发 hf JWT→302 到前端 `post_login#token=…`|✅|
|2.4|登录态可用|用返回 token 调 `GET /auth/me`|返回被绑定的 hf 用户|✅|
|2.5|前端按钮|登录页点 “Sign in with SSO”|全页跳转到后端 `/auth/oidc/login`|🟡|
|2.6|未配置 OIDC|`OIDC` 关闭时访问 `/auth/oidc/login`|503 “OIDC is not configured”|🟡|
|2.7|token 交换失败|code 失效/被篡改|回前端 `?oidc_error=exchange_failed`,登录页提示|⬜|
## 3. hf 用户 ↔ OIDC 身份绑定
| # | 测试点 | 步骤 | 预期 | 本地 |
|---|--------|------|------|------|
|3.1|管理员绑定|`PUT /users/{id}/oidc-binding` {issuer,subject}admin 或 acc-manager|200用户响应含 `oidc_issuer/oidc_subject`|✅|
|3.2|未绑定身份拒绝登录|解绑后用该 IdP 账号登录|回 `?oidc_error=not_linked`**不签发 token**(不自动开号)|✅|
|3.3|身份唯一性|把同一 (issuer,subject) 绑到另一用户|409 冲突|✅|
|3.4|解绑|`DELETE /users/{id}/oidc-binding`|200绑定清空|✅|
|3.5|绑定鉴权|无凭据 / 普通用户调用绑定 API|401 / 403|✅|
|3.6|API key 通道|admin 的 API key 调用绑定/配置 API|200支持 JWT 或 API key|✅|
|3.7|自助绑定(非 ONLY|登录用户点侧栏 “Link OIDC account” 走一次 OIDC|回 `?oidc_linked=1`,当前账号绑定成功|🟡|
|3.8|自助绑定冲突|自助绑定到已被占用的身份|`?oidc_error=already_bound`|⬜|
|3.9|OIDC_ONLY 下禁自助|ONLY 模式访问 `/auth/oidc/link`|403仅管理员 API 可绑)|🟡|
## 4. HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY 模式
| # | 测试点 | 步骤 | 预期 | 本地 |
|---|--------|------|------|------|
|4.1|配置反映|ONLY=true 时 `GET /auth/config`|`oidc_only=true``password_login=false`|✅|
|4.2|禁用密码登录|`POST /auth/token`|403 “Password login is disabled (OIDC only)”|✅|
|4.3|建用户忽略密码|`POST /users` 带 password|201但 DB `hashed_password=NULL`(无密码用户)|✅|
|4.4|改用户忽略密码|`PATCH /users/{id}` 带 password|密码不被设置|🟡|
|4.5|无密码用户仍可用|对该用户绑定 OIDC、生成 API key|绑定 200、`reset-apikey` 200可经 OIDC 登录|✅|
|4.6|前端隐藏密码 UI|ONLY 模式打开登录页 / 用户管理页|无用户名密码框;用户管理无密码/重置密码组件|🟡|
|4.7|防锁死恢复|ONLY 模式且 OIDC 配错|管理员 API key 仍可调 `GET/PUT /auth/oidc/settings` 修复|✅|
## 5. 回归(不破坏既有功能)
| # | 测试点 | 步骤 | 预期 | 本地 |
|---|--------|------|------|------|
|5.1|默认模式密码登录|未开 ONLY 时 `POST /auth/token`|正常 200 签发 token|✅|
|5.2|用户响应新增字段|`GET /users` `/users/{id}` `/auth/me`|含 `oidc_issuer/oidc_subject`(未绑定为 null|✅|
|5.3|启动迁移幂等|新旧库重复启动后端|`users.oidc_*` 列与 `oidc_settings` 表存在,无报错|✅|
|5.4|前端构建|`npm run build`Docker 镜像)|TS 编译通过|✅|
|5.5|后端导入|镜像内 `import app.main`|无导入错误OIDC 路由注册|✅|
|5.6|镜像参数|前后端 Dockerfile|含 `ARG/ENV HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY`|✅|
## 6. 安全检查点
- ID token 经 IdP JWKS 校验Authlib discovery + nonce签发的是 hf 原有
HS256 JWT依赖强 `SECRET_KEY`(弱 key 后端拒绝启动)。
- `client_secret` 持久化在 DB接口永不回显。
- 绑定/配置接口强制 admin或 account-manager 绑定),支持 API key 作为
OIDC_ONLY 下的恢复通道。
- 未绑定 OIDC 身份一律拒绝,不自动开号(防越权开户)。
- `redirect_uri` 必须在 IdP 精确注册;后端回跳前端地址来自服务端配置
`post_login_redirect`),不接受客户端传入,避免开放重定向。
## 7. 已知限制 / 待补
- 真实浏览器交互点按钮、IdP 同意页、SameSite cookie 行为)需人工过一遍
(本地已用 curl 无头跑通授权码全流程,逻辑等价)。
- 多 IdP / 多 issuer、token 刷新、登出联动SLO未实现超出本次范围。
- 自助绑定相关 UI3.7/3.8)建议人工在浏览器复核。

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@@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ alembic==1.13.1
python-dotenv==1.0.0
httpx==0.27.0
requests==2.31.0
authlib==1.3.2
itsdangerous==2.2.0