Files
Dialectic.Backend/internal/httpapi/routes.go
hzhang b02b1706b6 fix(oidc): clamp post_login_redirect to CORS allow-list (open-redirect)
Closes the open-redirect risk surfaced by the v0.3.x security audit:
the OIDC callback handler was using oidc_config.post_login_redirect
verbatim as the redirect base on both error and success paths. An
attacker with admin-key compromise (or a misconfigured operator) could
set that field to an external domain and turn /api/auth/oidc/callback
into a phishing redirector ('dialectic login failed → re-enter
password at evil.com/login').

Fix:
  - New AuthHandler.safeRedirectBase(raw) validator:
      * empty → '/'
      * relative path starting with '/' (but not '//') → keep as-is
      * absolute URL whose host is in the allow-list → keep as-is
      * everything else → '/'
  - allow-list sourced from cfg.CORSAllowOrigins (the same set we
    already trust for browser CORS), threaded through NewAuthHandler.
  - Applied on BOTH the error branch and success branch of Callback.

Also: drop redundant newline on cmd/dialectic-cli usage Fprintln so
go test ./... passes.

No behavior change for happy path: prod's PostLoginRedirect is
'https://dialectic.hangman-lab.top/oidc/callback', which matches the
CORS allow-list ('https://dialectic.hangman-lab.top'), so the
validator returns it unmodified.
2026-05-24 10:03:53 +01:00

248 lines
9.0 KiB
Go

package httpapi
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
chimw "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"github.com/go-chi/cors"
"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
"git.hangman-lab.top/hzhang/Dialectic.Backend/internal/auth"
"git.hangman-lab.top/hzhang/Dialectic.Backend/internal/config"
"git.hangman-lab.top/hzhang/Dialectic.Backend/internal/httpapi/handlers"
"git.hangman-lab.top/hzhang/Dialectic.Backend/internal/oidc"
"git.hangman-lab.top/hzhang/Dialectic.Backend/internal/store"
)
// sessionVerifierAdapter wires internal/oidc.Service into auth's
// SessionVerifier interface (which uses auth.SessionClaims to stay
// import-cycle-free).
type sessionVerifierAdapter struct{ s *oidc.Service }
func (a sessionVerifierAdapter) VerifySession(raw string) (*auth.SessionClaims, error) {
c, err := a.s.VerifySession(raw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &auth.SessionClaims{Sub: c.Sub, Email: c.Email, Name: c.Name}, nil
}
// Mount returns the root router with all v2 endpoints wired. Owners of
// individual middleware chains:
//
// - /api/healthz : public (no auth)
// - /api/auth/* : OIDC login flow + session
// - /api/topics : mixed — list/get optional auth (anon
// sees public only); create requires CallerAgent or CallerUser
// - /api/topics/{id}/signups : agent-only (CallerAgent)
//
// Browser-side OIDC and agent-side bearer middlewares co-exist on the
// same route by being "optional auth" — if either succeeds, Caller is
// attached; otherwise the handler sees anonymous and decides whether
// to 401 or fall through to public behavior.
func Mount(cfg *config.Config, db *sqlx.DB, oidcSvc *oidc.Service, version string) http.Handler {
r := chi.NewRouter()
// Boilerplate middleware — these run on every request.
r.Use(chimw.RealIP)
r.Use(chimw.RequestID)
r.Use(chimw.Logger)
r.Use(chimw.Recoverer)
r.Use(chimw.Timeout(30 * time.Second))
r.Use(cors.Handler(cors.Options{
AllowedOrigins: cfg.CORSAllowOrigins,
AllowedMethods: []string{"GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"},
AllowedHeaders: []string{"Accept", "Authorization", "Content-Type", "x-dev-bypass"},
ExposedHeaders: []string{},
AllowCredentials: true,
MaxAge: 300,
}))
verifier := sessionVerifierAdapter{s: oidcSvc}
// Auth middlewares — composed as "try agent, then user, else pass anonymous".
optionalAuth := optionalAuthChain(db, cfg, verifier)
requireAgent := auth.AgentAPIKey(db, cfg.AgentAPIKeyPepper) // strict bearer
requireAnyAuth := requireAnyAuthChain(db, cfg, verifier)
// Handler instances.
topicStore := store.NewTopicStore(db)
signupStore := store.NewSignupStore(db)
campStore := store.NewCampStore(db)
roundStore := store.NewRoundStore(db)
argStore := store.NewArgumentStore(db)
verdictStore := store.NewVerdictStore(db)
health := handlers.NewHealthHandler(db, version)
topicsH := handlers.NewTopicsHandler(topicStore, campStore)
signupsH := handlers.NewSignupsHandler(topicStore, signupStore)
argsH := handlers.NewArgumentsHandler(topicStore, campStore, roundStore, argStore)
verdictH := handlers.NewVerdictHandler(topicStore, campStore, verdictStore)
adminH := handlers.NewAdminHandler(db, cfg.AgentAPIKeyPepper, cfg.DialecticAdminAPIKey)
// Cookie Secure: in prod nginx terminates TLS upstream, so requests
// hit the backend over plain HTTP. Setting Secure=true on the
// cookie would prevent the browser from sending it back. The
// SameSite=Lax + HttpOnly defenses still apply; CF/origin TLS
// covers the wire.
// Pass the configured CORS allow-list as the open-redirect allowlist
// for the OIDC callback — the SPA hosts we already trust for CORS
// are by definition the same hosts a legitimate PostLoginRedirect
// can target. Anything else (incl. attacker-set values written via
// admin cli compromise) gets clamped back to "/" inside the
// handler.
authH := handlers.NewAuthHandler(oidcSvc, "dialectic_session", false, cfg.CORSAllowOrigins)
// Routes.
r.Route("/api", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/healthz", health.Healthz)
// OIDC login flow + session — public endpoints (no auth
// middleware; they ARE the auth surface).
r.Get("/auth/oidc/status", authH.Status)
r.Get("/auth/oidc/start", authH.Start)
r.Get("/auth/oidc/callback", authH.Callback)
r.Post("/auth/oidc/exchange", authH.Exchange)
// /auth/me + /auth/logout need an authenticated session to be
// meaningful, but /auth/me returns 401 cleanly so SPA can call
// it on mount as a "who am i" probe.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(optionalAuth)
r.Get("/auth/me", authH.Me)
r.Post("/auth/logout", authH.Logout)
})
// Topics: list+get optional-auth (visibility-gated by handler);
// create+visibility-flip require any auth.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(optionalAuth)
r.Get("/topics", topicsH.List)
r.Get("/topics/{id}", topicsH.Get)
r.Get("/topics/{id}/arguments", argsH.List)
r.Get("/topics/{id}/verdict", verdictH.Get)
})
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requireAnyAuth)
r.Post("/topics", topicsH.Create)
r.Put("/topics/{id}/visibility", topicsH.SetVisibility)
})
// Signups, arguments, verdict POST: agent-only.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requireAgent)
r.Post("/topics/{id}/signups", signupsH.Create)
r.Post("/topics/{id}/arguments", argsH.Post)
r.Post("/topics/{id}/verdict", verdictH.Submit)
})
// List signups: any authenticated caller.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(requireAnyAuth)
r.Get("/topics/{id}/signups", signupsH.List)
})
// Admin: provision an agent api key + per-agent activity summary.
// Auth is its own header (x-dialectic-admin-key against env
// DIALECTIC_ADMIN_API_KEY), not bearer — admin lifecycle is
// separate from agent identity.
r.Post("/admin/agent-keys", adminH.ProvisionAgentKey)
r.Get("/admin/agents/{id}", adminH.GetAgentSummary)
})
return r
}
// optionalAuthChain: if either auth method succeeds, attach Caller;
// otherwise let the request through anonymous. Handlers decide what
// to do with anonymous (typically: serve public subset, hide private).
func optionalAuthChain(db *sqlx.DB, cfg *config.Config, verifier auth.SessionVerifier) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
agent := auth.AgentAPIKey(db, cfg.AgentAPIKeyPepper)
oidcMw := auth.OIDCBrowser(verifier, cfg.IsDev(), cfg.OIDCDevBypassToken, cfg.OIDCOnly)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Bearer present → try agent path; on success it ServeHTTPs next.
// On failure it 401s, which we want to demote to "anonymous" for
// optional auth. The pattern is: capture the response; if it's
// 401, fall through to OIDC; if OIDC also 401s, finally fall
// through to next (anonymous).
if r.Header.Get("authorization") != "" {
rw := &captureWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
agent(next).ServeHTTP(rw, r)
if rw.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return
}
}
// Try OIDC (session cookie) — always (no header gate needed,
// cookie presence is implicit) so an authenticated browser
// always gets its identity attached.
if hasSession(r) || r.Header.Get("x-dev-bypass") != "" {
rw := &captureWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
oidcMw(next).ServeHTTP(rw, r)
if rw.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return
}
}
// Anonymous — call next with no Caller attached.
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
// requireAnyAuthChain: 401 if neither agent nor user auth succeeds.
func requireAnyAuthChain(db *sqlx.DB, cfg *config.Config, verifier auth.SessionVerifier) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
agent := auth.AgentAPIKey(db, cfg.AgentAPIKeyPepper)
oidcMw := auth.OIDCBrowser(verifier, cfg.IsDev(), cfg.OIDCDevBypassToken, cfg.OIDCOnly)
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Header.Get("authorization") != "" {
rw := &captureWriter{ResponseWriter: w}
agent(next).ServeHTTP(rw, r)
if rw.status != http.StatusUnauthorized {
return
}
}
oidcMw(next).ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
}
func hasSession(r *http.Request) bool {
c, err := r.Cookie("dialectic_session")
return err == nil && c != nil && strings.TrimSpace(c.Value) != ""
}
// captureWriter records the status so the optional-auth chain can
// distinguish "401 from inner middleware (try next)" from "actual
// response from handler (deliver)". Body bytes are passed through
// when status != 401.
type captureWriter struct {
http.ResponseWriter
status int
wroteHeader bool
suppressing bool
}
func (c *captureWriter) WriteHeader(s int) {
c.status = s
c.wroteHeader = true
if s == http.StatusUnauthorized {
// don't actually write — we may fall through
c.suppressing = true
return
}
c.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(s)
}
func (c *captureWriter) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if c.suppressing {
// swallow; caller will fall through to next chain step
return len(b), nil
}
if !c.wroteHeader {
c.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
c.wroteHeader = true
}
return c.ResponseWriter.Write(b)
}