hzhang
3f5f813c65
Addresses findings from the security audit: - H1: add check_project_role to the legacy misc.py create endpoints (milestones=mgr, tasks/supports/meetings=dev) that previously required only authentication — closing a cross-project write bypass available to any logged-in user or agent API key. - M2: comments are always attributed to the authenticated caller; the client-supplied author_id is dropped (no author spoofing). - M3: API keys are stored as SHA-256 hashes (key_hash) plus a short key_prefix for display — never plaintext. Lookup hashes the presented key; listings never expose the secret. Includes an idempotent migration for existing deployments. - M5: the OIDC session cookie's Secure flag is env-driven via SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE (default True; set false for plain-HTTP dev). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
114 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
114 lines
4.0 KiB
Python
"""Shared auth dependencies."""
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import hashlib
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta
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from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
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from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer, APIKeyHeader
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from jose import JWTError, jwt
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from passlib.context import CryptContext
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from app.core.config import get_db, settings
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from app.models import models
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from app.models.apikey import APIKey
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pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
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oauth2_scheme = OAuth2PasswordBearer(tokenUrl="/auth/token", auto_error=False)
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apikey_header = APIKeyHeader(name="X-API-Key", auto_error=False)
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class Token(BaseModel):
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access_token: str
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token_type: str
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def verify_password(plain_password: str, hashed_password: str) -> bool:
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if not hashed_password:
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return False
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return pwd_context.verify(plain_password, hashed_password)
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def get_password_hash(password: str) -> str:
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return pwd_context.hash(password[:72])
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def create_access_token(data: dict, expires_delta: timedelta = None) -> str:
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to_encode = data.copy()
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expire = datetime.utcnow() + (expires_delta or timedelta(minutes=30))
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to_encode.update({"exp": expire})
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return jwt.encode(to_encode, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithm=settings.ALGORITHM)
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async def get_current_user(token: str = Depends(oauth2_scheme), db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
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credentials_exception = HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Could not validate credentials",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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if not token:
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raise credentials_exception
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(token, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM])
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user_id = payload.get("sub")
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if user_id is None:
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raise credentials_exception
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except JWTError:
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raise credentials_exception
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user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == user_id).first()
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if user is None:
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raise credentials_exception
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return user
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def hash_api_key(raw: str) -> str:
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"""SHA-256 of a raw API key. Keys are high-entropy random tokens, so a
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fast hash (not bcrypt) is appropriate and allows O(1) lookup by hash."""
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return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest()
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def _lookup_api_key(db: Session, key: str) -> models.User | None:
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"""Resolve an API key string to a User; mark last_used_at on hit."""
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if not key:
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return None
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key_obj = db.query(APIKey).filter(APIKey.key_hash == hash_api_key(key), APIKey.is_active == True).first() # noqa: E712
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if not key_obj:
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return None
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key_obj.last_used_at = datetime.utcnow()
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db.commit()
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return db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.id == key_obj.user_id).first()
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async def get_current_user_or_apikey(
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token: str = Depends(oauth2_scheme),
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api_key: str = Depends(apikey_header),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db)
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):
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"""Authenticate via JWT token (Authorization: Bearer <jwt>) OR API key
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(X-API-Key: <key>, OR — as a convenience for CLI clients that only know
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Bearer — Authorization: Bearer <api-key>; falls back when JWT decode fails).
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"""
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# Native X-API-Key header
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if api_key:
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user = _lookup_api_key(db, api_key)
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if user:
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return user
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# Bearer header — try JWT first, then API key on decode failure
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if token:
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try:
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return await get_current_user(token=token, db=db)
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except HTTPException:
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user = _lookup_api_key(db, token)
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if user:
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return user
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raise
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raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
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def require_admin(current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)) -> models.User:
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"""Dependency: caller must be a global admin (JWT or API key)."""
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if not getattr(current_user, "is_admin", False):
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raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Admin privileges required")
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return current_user
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