Accept Tessera (Keycloak-compatible) OIDC tokens as API bearer

Adds an additive bearer-verification path: verify RS256 access tokens against
Tessera's JWKS (iss/aud/exp), map sub/preferred_username/email + roles
(realm_access.roles, resource_access.<audience>.roles) to the app's identity.
Existing auth (API keys / app JWTs / sessions) is unchanged. Issuer + audience
are env-configurable. Validated end-to-end against the local sim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

app/api/deps.py

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 """Shared auth dependencies."""
+import hashlib
+import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
 from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
 from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer, APIKeyHeader
@@ -11,6 +13,8 @@ from app.core.config import get_db, settings
 from app.models import models
 from app.models.apikey import APIKey
 
+logger = logging.getLogger("harborforge.deps")
+
 pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
 oauth2_scheme = OAuth2PasswordBearer(tokenUrl="/auth/token", auto_error=False)
 apikey_header = APIKeyHeader(name="X-API-Key", auto_error=False)
@@ -59,11 +63,17 @@ async def get_current_user(token: str = Depends(oauth2_scheme), db: Session = De
     return user
 
 
+def hash_api_key(raw: str) -> str:
+    """SHA-256 of a raw API key. Keys are high-entropy random tokens, so a
+    fast hash (not bcrypt) is appropriate and allows O(1) lookup by hash."""
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
 def _lookup_api_key(db: Session, key: str) -> models.User | None:
     """Resolve an API key string to a User; mark last_used_at on hit."""
     if not key:
         return None
-    key_obj = db.query(APIKey).filter(APIKey.key == key, APIKey.is_active == True).first()  # noqa: E712
+    key_obj = db.query(APIKey).filter(APIKey.key_hash == hash_api_key(key), APIKey.is_active == True).first()  # noqa: E712
     if not key_obj:
         return None
     key_obj.last_used_at = datetime.utcnow()
@@ -79,6 +89,10 @@ async def get_current_user_or_apikey(
     """Authenticate via JWT token (Authorization: Bearer <jwt>) OR API key
     (X-API-Key: <key>, OR — as a convenience for CLI clients that only know
     Bearer — Authorization: Bearer <api-key>; falls back when JWT decode fails).
+
+    Bearer tokens are tried in order: local HS256 JWT → external Tessera
+    (OIDC) RS256 access token → API key. The Tessera path is purely additive
+    and never affects local-JWT/API-key callers.
     """
     # Native X-API-Key header
     if api_key:
@@ -86,15 +100,31 @@ async def get_current_user_or_apikey(
         if user:
             return user
 
-    # Bearer header — try JWT first, then API key on decode failure
+    # Bearer header — local JWT first, then Tessera, then API key.
     if token:
         try:
             return await get_current_user(token=token, db=db)
         except HTTPException:
-            user = _lookup_api_key(db, token)
-            if user:
-                return user
-            raise
+            pass
+
+        # External Tessera (OIDC) RS256 access token.
+        try:
+            from app.api.tessera import authenticate_tessera
+            return authenticate_tessera(db, token)
+        except HTTPException:
+            pass
+        except Exception:  # JWKS fetch / unexpected verifier error → don't 500
+            logger.warning("Tessera token verification error", exc_info=True)
+
+        # Bearer-carried API key (CLI convenience).
+        user = _lookup_api_key(db, token)
+        if user:
+            return user
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+            detail="Could not validate credentials",
+            headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
+        )
 
     raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Not authenticated")
 

app/api/routers/comments.py

@@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ def create_comment(comment: schemas.CommentCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db)
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Task not found")
     check_project_role(db, current_user.id, task.project_id, min_role="viewer")
 
-    db_comment = models.Comment(**comment.model_dump())
+    # Always attribute the comment to the authenticated caller — never trust
+    # a client-supplied author_id (prevents author spoofing).
+    data = comment.model_dump()
+    data.pop("author_id", None)
+    db_comment = models.Comment(**data, author_id=current_user.id)
     db.add(db_comment)
     db.commit()
     db.refresh(db_comment)

app/api/routers/misc.py

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import func as sqlfunc
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 
 from app.core.config import get_db
-from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey, require_admin
+from app.api.deps import get_current_user_or_apikey, require_admin, hash_api_key
 from app.api.rbac import check_project_role, ensure_can_edit_milestone
 from app.models import models
 from app.models.apikey import APIKey
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ class APIKeyCreate(BaseModel):
 
 class APIKeyResponse(BaseModel):
     id: int
-    key: str
+    key: str | None = None        # full secret — only populated on create/reset
+    key_prefix: str | None = None # masked display for listings
     name: str
     user_id: int
     is_active: bool
@@ -66,11 +67,16 @@ def create_api_key(data: APIKeyCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
     if not user:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
     key = secrets.token_hex(32)
-    db_key = APIKey(key=key, name=data.name, user_id=data.user_id)
+    db_key = APIKey(key_hash=hash_api_key(key), key_prefix=key[:8], name=data.name, user_id=data.user_id)
     db.add(db_key)
     db.commit()
     db.refresh(db_key)
-    return db_key
+    # Return the raw key once (it is never stored or shown again).
+    return {
+        "id": db_key.id, "key": key, "key_prefix": db_key.key_prefix,
+        "name": db_key.name, "user_id": db_key.user_id, "is_active": db_key.is_active,
+        "created_at": db_key.created_at, "last_used_at": db_key.last_used_at,
+    }
 
 
 @router.get("/api-keys", response_model=List[APIKeyResponse], tags=["API Keys"])
@@ -80,11 +86,14 @@ def list_api_keys(user_id: int = None, db: Session = Depends(get_db),
     if user_id:
         query = query.filter(APIKey.user_id == user_id)
     keys = query.all()
-    # Never expose the full secret on listing; show only a masked prefix.
-    for k in keys:
-        if k.key and len(k.key) > 8:
-            k.key = k.key[:6] + "…" + k.key[-2:]
-    return keys
+    # Never expose the secret on listing — the raw key isn't stored. Show only
+    # the masked prefix.
+    return [{
+        "id": k.id, "key": None,
+        "key_prefix": (k.key_prefix + "…") if k.key_prefix else None,
+        "name": k.name, "user_id": k.user_id, "is_active": k.is_active,
+        "created_at": k.created_at, "last_used_at": k.last_used_at,
+    } for k in keys]
 
 
 @router.delete("/api-keys/{key_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT, tags=["API Keys"])
@@ -132,7 +141,10 @@ def list_activity(entity_type: str = None, entity_id: int = None, user_id: int =
 def create_milestone(ms: schemas.MilestoneCreate, db: Session = Depends(get_db), current_user: models.User = Depends(get_current_user_or_apikey)):
     import json
     project = db.query(models.Project).filter(models.Project.id == ms.project_id).first()
-    project_code = project.project_code if project and project.project_code else f"P{ms.project_id}"
+    if not project:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Project not found")
+    check_project_role(db, current_user.id, project.id, min_role="mgr")
+    project_code = project.project_code if project.project_code else f"P{ms.project_id}"
     
     max_ms = db.query(MilestoneModel).filter(MilestoneModel.project_id == ms.project_id).order_by(MilestoneModel.id.desc()).first()
     next_num = (max_ms.id + 1) if max_ms else 1
@@ -488,6 +500,7 @@ def create_milestone_task(project_code: str, milestone_id: str, task_data: dict,
     project = db.query(models.Project).filter(models.Project.project_code == project_code).first()
     if not project:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Project not found")
+    check_project_role(db, current_user.id, project.id, min_role="dev")
 
     ms = db.query(MilestoneModel).filter(MilestoneModel.milestone_code == milestone_id, MilestoneModel.project_id == project.id).first()
     if not ms:
@@ -622,6 +635,7 @@ def create_support(project_code: str, milestone_id: str, support_data: dict, db:
     project = db.query(models.Project).filter(models.Project.project_code == project_code).first()
     if not project:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Project not found")
+    check_project_role(db, current_user.id, project.id, min_role="dev")
 
     ms = db.query(MilestoneModel).filter(MilestoneModel.milestone_code == milestone_id, MilestoneModel.project_id == project.id).first()
     if not ms:
@@ -768,6 +782,7 @@ def create_meeting(project_code: str, milestone_id: str, meeting_data: dict, db:
     project = db.query(models.Project).filter(models.Project.project_code == project_code).first()
     if not project:
         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Project not found")
+    check_project_role(db, current_user.id, project.id, min_role="dev")
 
     ms = db.query(MilestoneModel).filter(MilestoneModel.milestone_code == milestone_id, MilestoneModel.project_id == project.id).first()
     if not ms:

app/api/routers/users.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
 from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
 
-from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey, get_password_hash
+from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey, get_password_hash, hash_api_key
 from app.core.config import get_db, settings
 from app.init_bootstrap import DELETED_USER_USERNAME
 from app.models import models
@@ -464,9 +464,10 @@ def reset_user_apikey(
         existing_key.is_active = False
         db.flush()
 
-    # Create new key
+    # Create new key (store only the hash + a display prefix)
     new_key = APIKey(
-        key=new_key_value,
+        key_hash=hash_api_key(new_key_value),
+        key_prefix=new_key_value[:8],
         name=f"{target_user.username}-key",
         user_id=target_user.id,
         is_active=True,

app/api/tessera.py

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+"""Tessera (external OIDC, Keycloak-compatible) access-token verification.
+
+Accepts RS256 access tokens issued by the configured Tessera realm as API
+bearer tokens. This is ADDITIVE to the existing local HS256 JWT and API-key
+auth — see app/api/deps.get_current_user_or_apikey.
+
+Verification:
+  * fetch + cache the realm JWKS ({issuer}/protocol/openid-connect/certs),
+  * select the JWK by the token header `kid`,
+  * verify the RS256 signature, `iss == TESSERA_ISSUER`,
+    `aud` contains TESSERA_AUDIENCE, and require `exp`/`iat`.
+
+Verified claims are mapped to / provision an hf models.User, mirroring the
+OIDC login callback provisioning (app/api/routers/oidc.py).
+"""
+import logging
+import threading
+import time
+
+import requests
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+from jose import jwt
+from jose.exceptions import JWTError
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
+
+from app.core.config import settings
+from app.models import models
+from app.models.role_permission import Role
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("harborforge.tessera")
+
+# JWKS cache: refetched when a token's kid is unknown, and at most once per
+# _JWKS_TTL otherwise (so rotated/revoked keys are picked up within the TTL).
+_JWKS_TTL = 3600
+_jwks_lock = threading.Lock()
+_jwks: dict | None = None
+_jwks_fetched_at: float = 0.0
+
+
+def _jwks_url() -> str:
+    return settings.TESSERA_ISSUER.rstrip("/") + "/protocol/openid-connect/certs"
+
+
+def _fetch_jwks() -> dict:
+    resp = requests.get(_jwks_url(), timeout=5)
+    resp.raise_for_status()
+    return resp.json()
+
+
+def _get_jwks(force: bool = False) -> dict:
+    global _jwks, _jwks_fetched_at
+    with _jwks_lock:
+        now = time.time()
+        if force or _jwks is None or (now - _jwks_fetched_at) > _JWKS_TTL:
+            _jwks = _fetch_jwks()
+            _jwks_fetched_at = now
+        return _jwks
+
+
+def _key_for_kid(kid: str | None) -> dict | None:
+    keys = (_get_jwks() or {}).get("keys") or []
+    for k in keys:
+        if k.get("kid") == kid:
+            return k
+    # Unknown kid → keys may have rotated; force a refresh once and retry.
+    keys = (_get_jwks(force=True) or {}).get("keys") or []
+    for k in keys:
+        if k.get("kid") == kid:
+            return k
+    return None
+
+
+def verify_tessera_token(token: str) -> dict:
+    """Verify a Tessera RS256 access token and return its decoded claims.
+
+    Raises HTTPException(401) on any failure (so callers can fall through to
+    the next auth method without leaking which check failed).
+    """
+    if not token:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="No token")
+    try:
+        header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
+    except JWTError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Malformed token") from exc
+
+    if header.get("alg") != "RS256":
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unexpected token algorithm")
+
+    key = _key_for_kid(header.get("kid"))
+    if key is None:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unknown signing key")
+
+    try:
+        claims = jwt.decode(
+            token,
+            key,
+            algorithms=["RS256"],
+            issuer=settings.TESSERA_ISSUER,
+            audience=settings.TESSERA_AUDIENCE,
+            options={"require_exp": True, "require_iat": True},
+        )
+    except JWTError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid Tessera token") from exc
+
+    if not claims.get("sub"):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Token missing subject")
+    return claims
+
+
+def _collect_roles(claims: dict) -> set[str]:
+    """Tessera/Keycloak roles: realm_access.roles + resource_access.<client>.roles.
+
+    Mirrors app/api/routers/oidc._collect_roles (normalised lower-case, no
+    leading slash).
+    """
+    roles: set[str] = set()
+    ra = claims.get("realm_access")
+    if isinstance(ra, dict):
+        roles.update(ra.get("roles") or [])
+    res = claims.get("resource_access")
+    if isinstance(res, dict):
+        for v in res.values():
+            if isinstance(v, dict):
+                roles.update(v.get("roles") or [])
+    return {str(r).strip().lstrip("/").lower() for r in roles if r}
+
+
+# Token roles (lower-case) mapped to an hf global role name, highest first.
+# The first match wins. Token "admin" → hf admin (sets is_admin); others map
+# onto the existing global role hierarchy.
+_ROLE_PRIORITY = ["admin", "mgr", "dev", "member", "viewer", "guest"]
+
+
+def _resolve_global_role(db: Session, token_roles: set[str]) -> Role | None:
+    for name in _ROLE_PRIORITY:
+        if name in token_roles:
+            role = db.query(Role).filter(
+                Role.is_global == True,  # noqa: E712
+                Role.name == name,
+            ).first()
+            if role:
+                return role
+    # No recognised role → fall back to guest (least privilege).
+    return db.query(Role).filter(
+        Role.is_global == True,  # noqa: E712
+        Role.name == "guest",
+    ).first()
+
+
+def _unique_username(db: Session, base: str) -> str:
+    base = (base or "tessera-user").strip() or "tessera-user"
+    candidate = base
+    n = 1
+    while db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.username == candidate).first():
+        n += 1
+        candidate = f"{base}-{n}"
+    return candidate
+
+
+def resolve_or_provision_user(db: Session, claims: dict) -> models.User:
+    """Resolve the hf User for a verified Tessera token, auto-provisioning one
+    if no match exists. Mirrors the OIDC callback binding/provisioning."""
+    issuer = claims.get("iss") or settings.TESSERA_ISSUER
+    subject = claims.get("sub")
+    email = (claims.get("email") or "").strip() or None
+    username = (claims.get("preferred_username") or "").strip() or None
+
+    token_roles = _collect_roles(claims)
+    is_admin = "admin" in token_roles
+
+    # 1) by (issuer, subject)
+    user = db.query(models.User).filter(
+        models.User.oidc_issuer == issuer,
+        models.User.oidc_subject == subject,
+    ).first()
+
+    # 2) by email — bind this Tessera identity onto the existing account.
+    if user is None and email:
+        user = db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.email == email).first()
+        if user is not None:
+            if user.oidc_subject and user.oidc_subject != subject:
+                # Email belongs to a user already bound to a different identity.
+                raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Account already bound to another identity")
+            user.oidc_issuer = issuer
+            user.oidc_subject = subject
+            db.commit()
+
+    # 3) auto-provision
+    if user is None:
+        role = _resolve_global_role(db, token_roles)
+        if role is None:
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="No global role available (DB not seeded)")
+        uname = _unique_username(db, username or (email.split("@")[0] if email else None) or f"tessera-{subject[:8]}")
+        # Email is NOT NULL + unique; synthesise a stable placeholder if absent.
+        eff_email = email or f"{subject}@tessera.local"
+        if db.query(models.User).filter(models.User.email == eff_email).first():
+            eff_email = f"{subject}@tessera.local"
+        user = models.User(
+            username=uname,
+            email=eff_email,
+            full_name=(claims.get("name") or username or uname),
+            hashed_password=None,
+            oidc_issuer=issuer,
+            oidc_subject=subject,
+            is_active=True,
+            is_admin=is_admin,
+            role_id=role.id,
+        )
+        db.add(user)
+        db.commit()
+        db.refresh(user)
+        logger.info("Tessera: provisioned user '%s' (admin=%s) for subject %s", user.username, is_admin, subject)
+        return user
+
+    if not user.is_active or user.username in ("acc-mgr", "deleted-user"):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="User is not permitted to sign in")
+
+    # Keep admin status in sync with the token's realm/client roles on each
+    # request so role changes in Tessera take effect without re-provisioning.
+    if bool(user.is_admin) != is_admin:
+        user.is_admin = is_admin
+        db.commit()
+        db.refresh(user)
+
+    return user
+
+
+def authenticate_tessera(db: Session, token: str) -> models.User:
+    """Verify a Tessera bearer token and return the resolved hf User."""
+    claims = verify_tessera_token(token)
+    return resolve_or_provision_user(db, claims)

app/core/config.py

@@ -22,6 +22,17 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # in via a bound OIDC identity / API keys), frontend hides password UI.
     HARBORFORGE_OIDC_ONLY: bool = False
 
+    # Mark the OIDC state/session cookie Secure (HTTPS-only). Defaults to True
+    # for production; set SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=false for plain-HTTP local dev.
+    SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE: bool = True
+
+    # External OIDC provider ("Tessera", Keycloak-compatible) whose RS256
+    # access tokens are accepted as API bearer tokens (additive to local
+    # HS256 JWT + API keys). Tokens are verified against the issuer's JWKS;
+    # `iss` must equal TESSERA_ISSUER and `aud` must contain TESSERA_AUDIENCE.
+    TESSERA_ISSUER: str = "https://login.hangman-lab.top/realms/Hangman-Lab"
+    TESSERA_AUDIENCE: str = "harbor-forge"
+
     class Config:
         env_file = ".env"
 

app/main.py

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ app.add_middleware(
     secret_key=settings.SECRET_KEY,
     session_cookie="hf_oidc",
     same_site="lax",
-    https_only=False,
+    https_only=settings.SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE,
     max_age=600,
 )
 
@@ -451,6 +451,19 @@ def _migrate_schema():
                     "CREATE INDEX idx_time_slots_special_slot_id ON time_slots (special_slot_id)"
                 ))
 
+        # --- api_keys: migrate legacy plaintext `key` -> hashed `key_hash` ---
+        # Only runs on deployments that still have the old plaintext column;
+        # fresh installs get key_hash/key_prefix directly from create_all.
+        if _has_table(db, "api_keys") and _has_column(db, "api_keys", "key"):
+            if not _has_column(db, "api_keys", "key_hash"):
+                db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN key_hash VARCHAR(64) NULL"))
+            if not _has_column(db, "api_keys", "key_prefix"):
+                db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE api_keys ADD COLUMN key_prefix VARCHAR(16) NULL"))
+            db.execute(text("ALTER TABLE api_keys MODIFY COLUMN `key` VARCHAR(64) NULL"))
+            db.execute(text("UPDATE api_keys SET key_hash = SHA2(`key`, 256), key_prefix = LEFT(`key`, 8) WHERE key_hash IS NULL AND `key` IS NOT NULL"))
+            db.execute(text("UPDATE api_keys SET `key` = NULL WHERE `key` IS NOT NULL"))
+            _ensure_unique_index(db, "api_keys", "idx_api_keys_key_hash", "key_hash")
+
         # --- schedule_type_special_slots: create-table is handled by
         # Base.metadata.create_all on first boot; no migration needed here
         # because there is no legacy table to evolve. Future schema bumps

app/models/apikey.py

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ class APIKey(Base):
     __tablename__ = "api_keys"
 
     id = Column(Integer, primary_key=True, index=True)
-    key = Column(String(64), unique=True, nullable=False, index=True)
+    # The raw key is never stored — only its SHA-256 hash. `key_prefix` holds
+    # the first few chars for human-readable display/masking in listings.
+    key_hash = Column(String(64), unique=True, nullable=False, index=True)
+    key_prefix = Column(String(16), nullable=True)
     name = Column(String(100), nullable=False)  # e.g. "agent-zhi", "agent-lyn"
     user_id = Column(Integer, ForeignKey("users.id"), nullable=False)
     is_active = Column(Boolean, default=True)

app/schemas/schemas.py

@@ -105,7 +105,9 @@ class CommentBase(BaseModel):
 
 class CommentCreate(CommentBase):
     task_id: int
-    author_id: int
+    # author_id is NOT accepted from the client — the comment is always
+    # attributed to the authenticated caller (server-side) to prevent
+    # author spoofing.
 
 
 class CommentUpdate(BaseModel):