fix(security): RBAC on legacy create endpoints, hashed API keys, hardening
Addresses findings from the security audit: - H1: add check_project_role to the legacy misc.py create endpoints (milestones=mgr, tasks/supports/meetings=dev) that previously required only authentication — closing a cross-project write bypass available to any logged-in user or agent API key. - M2: comments are always attributed to the authenticated caller; the client-supplied author_id is dropped (no author spoofing). - M3: API keys are stored as SHA-256 hashes (key_hash) plus a short key_prefix for display — never plaintext. Lookup hashes the presented key; listings never expose the secret. Includes an idempotent migration for existing deployments. - M5: the OIDC session cookie's Secure flag is env-driven via SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE (default True; set false for plain-HTTP dev). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey, get_password_hash
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from app.api.deps import get_current_user, get_current_user_or_apikey, get_password_hash, hash_api_key
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from app.core.config import get_db, settings
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from app.init_bootstrap import DELETED_USER_USERNAME
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from app.models import models
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@@ -464,9 +464,10 @@ def reset_user_apikey(
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existing_key.is_active = False
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db.flush()
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# Create new key
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# Create new key (store only the hash + a display prefix)
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new_key = APIKey(
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key=new_key_value,
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key_hash=hash_api_key(new_key_value),
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key_prefix=new_key_value[:8],
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name=f"{target_user.username}-key",
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user_id=target_user.id,
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is_active=True,
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