Adds an additive bearer-verification path: verify RS256 access tokens against
Tessera's JWKS (iss/aud/exp), map sub/preferred_username/email + roles
(realm_access.roles, resource_access.<audience>.roles) to the app's identity.
Existing auth (API keys / app JWTs / sessions) is unchanged. Issuer + audience
are env-configurable. Validated end-to-end against the local sim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the OpenID Connect login flow Dialectic.Frontend will drive. Pattern
mirrors Fabric.Backend.Center: SPA → /api/auth/oidc/start → IdP →
/api/auth/oidc/callback → 302 to SPA with one-time ticket in URL fragment
→ SPA POST /api/auth/oidc/exchange → HttpOnly session cookie set.
What's added:
- internal/oidc/service.go — runtime OIDC service:
* BuildAuthorizeURL (PKCE S256 + random state, 10min ttl)
* HandleCallback (token exchange + ID token verify + ticket mint, 60s ttl)
* ExchangeTicket (ticket → session JWT, HS256 24h)
* VerifySession (cookie validation)
* GetConfig/SetConfig with sync.Map-backed state/ticket stores
* SweepExpired (call from background goroutine; clears stale entries)
- internal/db/migrations/004_oidc_config.sql — single-row oidc_config
table (issuer/client_id/client_secret/redirect_uri/post_login_redirect/
scopes/enabled). Runtime-mutable via dialectic-cli.
- internal/httpapi/handlers/auth.go — 5 endpoints:
GET /api/auth/oidc/status — { enabled }
GET /api/auth/oidc/start — 302 to IdP
GET /api/auth/oidc/callback — IdP returns; we 302 to SPA with ticket
POST /api/auth/oidc/exchange — ticket → cookie + user
GET /api/auth/me — current session user (401 if anon)
POST /api/auth/logout — clears cookie
- internal/auth: replaces the OIDCBrowser Phase-2C stub with one that
reads the session cookie via SessionVerifier; keeps dev-bypass
behind cfg.OIDCOnly gate (set OIDC_ONLY=true in prod to disable
dev-bypass entirely)
- cmd/dialectic-cli/main.go — new binary; subcommand
'config oidc [--issuer ... --client-id ... --client-secret ...
--callback-url ... --enabled true|false]'
Runs against same DB the backend uses; reachable via
'docker exec dialectic-backend dialectic-cli config oidc ...'
- Dockerfile: build both binaries; put on PATH for docker exec
Config:
- SESSION_SIGNING_KEY env: required in prod, ephemeral random in dev.
HS256 secret for session JWTs. Stable across restarts (rotation
invalidates every session — kill switch).
- OIDC_ONLY env: 'true' disables the dev-bypass path entirely; use
in prod once OIDC is configured.
- OIDC_ISSUER + OIDC_CLIENT_ID env are no longer required at boot —
they're advisory bootstrap values for the oidc_config DB row.
Deps:
- github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 (discovery + JWKS verify)
- golang.org/x/oauth2 (token exchange + PKCE)
- github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5 (session JWT)
- Bumped go.mod toolchain to 1.25.
Pairs with Dialectic.Frontend (next commit) which removes the
/agents/:id admin page and adds the login button + /oidc/callback
SPA route + AuthProvider that talks to these new endpoints.
Replaces the Python v1 (preserved on archive/python-v1 branch).
Stack: Go 1.23 + chi router + sqlx + MySQL 8. Distroless static
container. 12-factor config from env. Embedded SQL migrations.
Schema (internal/db/migrations/001_init.sql):
- topics: 议题 with 4-timestamp lifecycle (signup_open/close +
debate_start/end), visibility (default private), status state machine,
verdict_schema FK
- signups: agent self-enrollment with willing_camps (JSON array of
pro|con|judge), pre_validated audit flag, (topic,agent) unique
- camps: post-allocation lock (one row per topic+camp) — written by
Phase 2D allocator
- rounds + arguments: chronological debate transcript
- verdicts: judge structured output, one per topic, with token-cost
trail for future budgeting
- agent_keys + system_keys: peppered sha256 hashes, never raw
- verdict_schemas: seeded with binary, claim-resolution (for
analyze-intel), policy-recommendation, free-form
Auth (internal/auth):
- AgentAPIKey: real bearer-token middleware against agent_keys;
best-effort last_used_at touch on success
- OIDCBrowser: Phase 2 stub. Dev mode accepts x-dev-bypass header
(constant-time compare); prod 401s with a Phase-4-pending hint.
Real Keycloak JWKS verification lands with the frontend rewrite.
HTTP API (internal/httpapi):
- /api/healthz — db ping + version + uptime
- GET /api/topics — list with status/visibility/limit/offset filters;
anonymous callers see public only
- GET /api/topics/{id} — visibility-gated (private → 404 hide)
- POST /api/topics — create with RFC3339 lifecycle validation
(signup_open < signup_close <= debate_start < debate_end)
- PUT /api/topics/{id}/visibility — dialectic-admin role gate
- POST /api/topics/{id}/signups — agent self-enroll; rejects when
topic.status != signup_open OR outside signup window; idempotent
upsert per (topic, agent)
- GET /api/topics/{id}/signups — list (any authed caller)
Auth chains:
- optionalAuth: try bearer → try oidc → fall through anonymous
(handlers branch on Caller.Kind == ""). Uses captureWriter to demote
inner 401s to "try next" without leaking response bytes.
- requireAnyAuth: chain that 401s if neither succeeds.
- requireAgent: strict bearer-only (signup POST).
Run: `docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up --build`. Migrations
auto-apply on first connect; idempotent on reboot. README documents
env vars, dev bypass usage, agent-key provisioning SQL, and the
Phase 2D/E/3/4/5 roadmap.
go vet clean, gofmt clean, single 11M static binary.